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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the first years of the Archidamian War Sparta resolved 
to gain quick victory by invading and devastating Attica. 
Under the persuasive influence of Perikles the Athenians 
responded by seeking protection behind their walls and by 
avoiding pitched battles. They followed this strategy 
successfully until several years after Perikles' death. The 
Spartan invasions proved ineffective; thus, Sparta initiated 
a new strategy. It aimed to destabilize Athens' alliances in 
Thrace and the Hellespont, disrupt the tribute from these 
allies and, possibly, deprive Athens of its grain supply from 
the Black Sea. 
Execution of these plans required a secure route to 
Thrace for uninterrupted flow of support troops and logistical 
supplies. In the following it will be shown that such a route 
was not only gained by Sparta, but was secured and controlled 
during the Archidamian War by an unprecedented colonization 
effort of the Spartans in Trachis with the foundation of 
Herakleia Trachinia in 426. 1 
1 All Greek names, toponyms and terms will use the Greek 
spelling, with the exception of commonly used spell~ngs in 
English which are different from the Greek. All dates given 
hereafter will be B.C., unless otherwise noted. 
Ancient sources and modern commenta~ors place the new 
colony in the environs of the Trachinian cliffs along the 
southwestern rim of the Malian Gulf, 2 and concentrate on 
Herakleia's proximity to Thermopylai as the raison d'etre for 
its existence. Recent investigations of the Phokis-Doris 
Expedition of Loyola University contradict these theories. 3 
According to topographical and geological evidence, Herakleia 
could not, nor did, neutralize Thermopylai. Instead, Herakleia 
controlled an all-weather road system within a natural Isthmus 
corridor west of Thermopylai that connected the Malian and 
Corinthian Gulfs and bypassed Thermopylai. Located near the 
Corridor's northern entrance, the Dhema Gap, Herakleia was the 
key for Spartan movements between Central and Northern Greece. 
This study is based on autopsy and topographical research 
that the author completed in three seasons as a member of the 
Phokis-Doris Expedition in Greece. It will argue that Sparta 
selected the site of Herakleia to control this road system 
through Central Greece to implement new strategic plans in the 
latter part of the Archidamian War, 426-421. 
2 I accept with some reservations the generally accepted 
locus of the colony. A detailed discussion of the site of 
ancient Herakleia and its topography, based on ancient 
sources, modern investigators and autopsy will be given below. 
3 E. w. Kase et al. (eds.), The Great Isthmus Corridor 
Route, Minneapolis, 1991 
2 
CHAPTER II 
PROLEGOMENA 
Beginnings 
At the beginning of the Archidamian War the declared 
purpose of the Spartan Alliance was the liberation of the 
subjects of Athens (2.8.4) . 4 According to Thukydides, 
however, the true explanation for the Spartan initiative was 
fear created by the growth in Athenian power (1.23.6), and the 
consequent Spartan resolve to break that power and to dissolve 
the Athenian Empire (1.88; Gemme 1945:256; Hammond 1986:347). 
For Sparta, a land power, the strategy was simple: march 
into Attica in the spring to destroy homes and growing crops 
outside the walls of the city. 5 Such invasion had proved 
successful against Athens in the past. 6 Faced with the 
4 References to book and chapter in which the author's 
name is not given are to Thukydides. 
5 Attica was invaded in 431, 430, 428, 427 and 425. The 
longest period of time the Peloponnesians spent in Attica was 
40 days in 430 (2. 57); the shortest was 15 days in 425 
(4.6.2). In 429 there was no invasion, perhaps for fear of the 
plague (Kagan 1974:101-2). Instead, that year the Spartans 
began the siege of Plataiai. 
6 In 446 King Pleistoanax of Sparta invaded and laid 
waste Attica as far as Eleusis and Thria (1.114). Not long 
afterwards the Athenians made a truce with the Lakedaimonians 
and their allies which was to last for thirty years (1~115.1). 
3 
invasion of Attica, the Athenians could either go out to fight 
the enemy and meet certain defeat, or retreat within the 
walls and see homes and crops destroyed. 7 Effective siege 
techniques against walled cities had not been mastered by the 
Greeks of the fifth century, 8 and the storm or siege of 
Athens was not therefore considered a feasible alternative. 
Athenian strategy, following Perikles' mandate to counter 
the Spartan offensive, was clear: neither offer nor accept a 
land battle with the enemy; consider Athens an island to be 
safeguarded, and, if necessary, abandon homes and lands 
(1.143.4/5; 2.13; 2.65/67; Bengtson 1988:138). 9 An expected 
stalemate with Sparta would mean victory, because Sparta would 
eventually become disenchanted and seek peace. 10 
7 The Spartans would hope for a pitched battle with the 
Athenians. In any such battle the Peloponnesians would 
undoubtedly be victorious. Even Perikles conceded that in a 
single battle the Peloponnesians and their allies were strong 
enough to withstand all the Hellenes (1.141.6). The Spartans 
believed that after a year or two of invasions the Athenians 
would be forced to capitulate. No one believed Athens could 
last more than three years of repeated devastation (7.28.3). 
8 Sparta in particular was inept in siege warfare. The 
Lakedaimonians had to appeal to Athens for assistance in the 
siege of Ithome because of their own deficiencies in this 
technique (1.102.2; Gemme 1945:301; Kagan:1969:71; 1974:20). 
9 Perikles' strategy has been compared with the strategy 
of attrition of Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War 
(Delbrilck 1975:135-142, espec. excurs. #2 on p. 140; Adcock 
CAH 5 196; Bury 1975:253). 
10 Sparta had not been too eager to enter the war in the 
first place, but had deferred to the entreaties of Corinth 
whose commercial rivalry with Athens kindled the flames which 
led to the War (1.67-88; Gomme 1945 ad l.c.; Bengtson 
1988: 135). 
4 
Apparently, Sparta had not considered that Athens would 
be able to withstand the devastation of fields and crops by 
the importation of food by sea. 11 But, perhaps as early as 
429, the Spartans realized that their annual invasions of 
Attica would not force Athens to capitulate (Busolt 1920:322-
323; Gemme 1956b.395). They became aware that Athens' control 
of the Hellespont and the Bosporos insured regular and 
unimpeded shipments of grain from the littoral of the northern 
Aegean and the Black Sea. 12 So long as this food supply 
lasted, the Athenians could withstand the devastation of 
Attica. 13 Thus, Sparta had to find another strategy to 
11 The topographical similarity of Athens with her Long 
Walls to Miletos, which in 496 was able to withstand a long 
Persian siege because imports from the sea were available 
(Hdt. 1.17), was probably unknown to Sparta (Brunt JCAC 19 
1965:264). 
12 By the fifth century Athens was required to import 
food. Of the four main granaries serving the Mediterranean 
world in this period, Egypt after 454 was again under Persian 
influence (1.109.2-3; Diod. 11.75, 77); North Africa was under 
Carthaginian influence; and Sicily and southern Italy were not 
only a great distance away but under the influence of Sparta 
(Ehrenberg 1951:326; Michell 1957:20,228; French 1964: 108-
113). The littoral of the Black Sea, and the northern Aegean, 
were the most important granaries for Athens, also supplying 
other food stuffs, including dried fish. 
13 The importance of the Hellespontine route for Athens 
cannot be overstated (Kagan 1969:179-80; Noonan, "The Grain 
Trade of the Northern Black Sea in Antiquity," AJP 1973:231-
42; Starr 1989:17). After the Samian and Byzantine rebellions 
had been subdued, Perikles resolved to strengthen Athenian 
influence in the area. The founding of Amphipolis in 437 was 
intended to prevent rebellion and guard the vital route to the 
Hellespont (4.102.3; Kagan 1969:187). 
5 
interdict the shipment of these supplies and to force the 
capitulation of Athens. 
Changed Strategy 
Thrace, the littoral of the northern Aegean, was the only 
region of the extended Athenian empire that was vulnerable by 
land. If the Spartans, with the most formidable army in 
Greece, could gain control of Thrace, they could strike a 
serious blow at Athens' tribute-paying allies. 14 Amphipolis 
in Thrace had the greatest value to Athens (Brunt JCAC 
1965:274; Kagan 1974:288); it not only furnished mining 
revenues and timber, it also commanded the Strymon river 
crossing and the route to the rich subject allies of Athens on 
the Hellespont and the Bosporos. 
Athens' hold over these territories was tenuous at best. 
Athenian supremacy in the Attic Maritime League had from the 
sixties onward induced various members to avoid her oppressive 
rule {Bengtson 1988:129). 15 Furthermore, the revolt of 
Potidaia in 432 had been followed by revolts of the Bottiaians 
and Chalkidians, and these revolts had never been suppressed 
(1.57.5;58;2.79; Bengtson 1988:136). The siege of Potidaia 
14 The formulation of this brilliant strategy has been 
attributed to Brasidas (Gemme 1956b:395 n. 4; Kagan 1974:196). 
Cartledge calls Brasidas the founder of Herakleia {1987:45). 
Thukydides does not comment on Brasidas' role in the 
formulation of the plan. 
15 There is evidence for more than 400 cities in the Attic 
Maritime League in 425, according to Bengtson (1988:115). 
Starr states that at its height Athens ruled directly 179 
states which included perhaps 2,000,000 Greeks {1989:38). 
6 
also had taught a lesson to both Athens and Sparta. Athens 
became aware of the precariousness of her alliances in that 
region, 16 and Sparta painfully realized that lack of a land 
passage to Thrace forced her to abandon Potidaia to Athens. 17 
Thus, a new Spartan strategy was formulated. It aimed to 
strike at the tribute-paying allies of Athens along the 
Thracian littoral. The Spartans hoped that the presence of 
spartan hoplites in Chalkidike and Thrace would induce other 
allies of Athens to rebel {Gemme 1956b:359; Busolt 1967:1011 
& n. 1) 18 and imperil Athens' supply of grain from the Black 
Sea (4.108.1; 105.1; Gomme 1956b:580-581; Brunt JCAC 1965:274; 
Kagan 1974:196; Bengtson 1988:124). 
Sparta's Opportunity 
To implement this new strategy Sparta needed an overland 
route through Central Greece and Thessaly, as well as an 
easily defensible base to guarantee the flow of logistical 
16 After the tenuousness of support in the Chalkidike 
became clear, Athens attempted to strengthen alliances with 
the Thracian tribes, particularly the Odrysians, and Macedon. 
By a diplomatic coup in 431 Athens gained an alliance with 
Sitalkes, the King of Thrace (2.29). Sitalkes brought about a 
short-lived reconciliation between Athens and Macedon. 
17 • Grote accurately observed that it was "the impractica-
bility of such passage" by the Spartans that forced them "to 
leave Potidaia to its fate" {Grote 6.308). 
18 • In 432 the Corinthians at the Assembly of Sparta and 
her allies had suggested that the Spartans assist the allies 
of Athens to revolt, thereby depriving Athens of revenue and 
sailors (1.121). Following the revolt of Mytelene in 428, 
Sparta sent a fleet of 40 ships to assist the rebellious 
Lesbians {3.26.1). 
7 
support to the north (3. 92. 4; Brunt JCAC 19 1965: Kagan 
1974:196). 
A unique opportunity presented itself to Sparta, probably 
by the third year of the Archidamian War, i.e. 429/428, to 
gain control of such a route through Central Greece and 
establish a base at a key geographic location in Malis in the 
direction of Thrace. The route was partially controlled by the 
oitaians (Szemler GICR 83-86), whose mountainous region lay 
between Trachis to the north and the Doris to the south. 
unable to resist effectively the aggressive ravaging of their 
territories by the Oitaians, the Trachinians and Dorians 
requested Spartan assistance (3.92.2). The Spartans' response 
to the invitation was predictable. They decided to dispatch 
colonists to the Malian Gulf to found a fortified colony, from 
which they would have access to Thrace. 
But Sparta had never been a colonizer, and its expansion 
had historically been within the Peloponnese. The decision to 
found a colony was an extraordinary event in Spartan history. 
Sparta colonized Taras or Tarentum in Italy circa 700 with 
partheniai, young Spartans born out of wedlock while the 
Spartan army was away at war, only because the government 
wanted to get rid of them (Strabo 6.3.2-3). Earlier myths 
relate Spartan origins for Lyttos in Crete, Lokri in Italy and 
Thera (A.H.M. Jones 11/12). 
8 
Doris was the traditional mother city of Sparta, and for 
intervention in Trachis, Sparta could claim a moral 
imperative19 (1.107.2). Omens and natural catastrophes 
occurring at the time may have also influenced the highly 
superstitious Spartans that the timing was propitious, 20 but 
the decision was based on newly formulated strategic 
considerations. 
19 Diodoros Sikoulos informs us that it was because of 
the Spartans' kinship with the Dorians and because Herakles, 
their ancestor, had made his home in Trachis that they decided 
to make the colony into a great city (Diod. 12.59.4). 
20 The Spartans had consulted the oracle of Delphi in 
432 whether it was propitious to go to war against Athens. The 
god told them they would be victorious, and that he himself 
would help them (1.118.3). The Spartans might assume that the 
plague, which struck the population in Athens and the troops 
of Hagnon besieging Potidaia (2.58.2) was the action of the 
god. Apollo has traditionally been identified as the god of 
pestilence. Cf. Smintheos, the mouse-god, in Iliad Bk. 1. 
In the winter of 427 a great number of earthquakes occurred in 
Athens, Euboia and Boiotia (3.87.4). In the same winter the 
plague broke out again in Athens. In the summer of 426, the 
year Herakleia was founded, an earthquake forced King Agis of 
Sparta to abort at the Isthmus the fifth campaign to Attica 
(3.89.1; Died. 12.59.1). In the same summer devastating floods 
occurred in Euboia and the coast of Opuntian Lokris, 
destroying Athenian fortifications at Atalante (3.89.2-4). 
Earthquakes also caused the postponement of the meeting of the 
Ekklesia (5.45.4) According to Thukydides no other period in 
history witnessed disasters, such as earthquakes, eclipses of 
the sun, droughts, famine and pestilence as the Peloponnesian 
War (1.23.1-3). 
9 
CHAPTER III 
HERAKLEIA: PURPOSE AND FOUNDATION 
Ancient Sources 
Among the many ancient Greek and Roman literary sources 
which refer to Herakleia Trachinia, 21 only Thukydides and 
oiodoros make any direct reference to the foundation of the 
colony. Both attribute the foundation of the colony to 
Sparta's intention to support the Dorians and Trachinians in 
their struggle against Oitaian aggression. 
21 All ancient sources referring to Herakleia, other 
than Thukydides and Diodoros Sikoulos, concern themselves with 
events occurring in the centuries after its foundation. 
Xenophon describes the defeat of the Herakleiots by the 
Oitaians in 409 and the destruction of its walls by Jason of 
Pherai in 371 (Xen. Hell. 1.2.18; 6.4.7; 6.4.27; 6.5.23). 
Pausanias provides valuable descriptions of its topography and 
environs and its connection with Herodotos' "Pass through 
Trachis" into Greece, in relating the invasion of Central 
Greece by the Celts in 279 (Her. 8.31-35; Paus. 10.20.6-8; 
21.1-2; 22.1; 22.8; 23.12). Strabo's references to 
topographical landmarks, e.g. the Asopos river, are invaluable 
in locating the site (Strabo 8.6.24; 8.8.5;9.2.23; 9.4.13; 
9.4.17). Livy, writing half a millennium after the foundation 
of Herakleia, describes the city when it was besieged by the 
Romans in 191. Livy is useful for locating physical landmarks, 
e.g. the citadel, and confirming Herakleia's strategic 
importance for the control of the Corridor (Livy 28.5; 31.46; 
33.3; 36.15-17; 36.22-25; 36.30). Although none of these 
authors discuss the foundation of the colony, their importance 
in assessing its location and strategic importance requires 
that they be evaluated carefully. 
10 
The alleged main purpose is explained by Thukydides as 
follows: 22 
x CIT. 'T7ro OE TOV xpo11011 TOVTOV AaKEOatµ.oz•toi •11 , , , , T , • , 8 , palCl\.Elall T1]'JI E'JI paxtl'LCf U11"0llCLall /Ca LCTTaVTO 
2 a11"0 TOtaCTOE ryvwµ.TJfj. l\117At~fj oi fuµ.11"a'JITEfj Elal, 
µ.E.v Tpia µ.ipTJ, riapc.iA.iot, 'lepijfj, T paxivio1,· Tou-
TCAJJJ OE ol Tpaxivtoi 'lrOAEµ.cp ecfJ8apµ.ivo£ inro 
() 
t I t I ti \ "' "I. "I. I 
£Ta£CIJV oµ.opwv OVTCIJV, TO 'Ir pwTOV µ.El\.l\.TJCTa'JITEfj 
, ABrwaiotfj 7rpocr8eiva£ crc/Jtis avTovr:;, oeiuavTE~ OE 
\ t ,1..' ' • I t A . 
µT} ov a.,.un '1f'l<TT0£ CrJCTl, 'lrE/J.'lrOVO"lll E~ •lQICE-
3 oalµova E.A.oµ.evoi 7rpea{1evT~V Tetaaµ.Evov. Evve-
7rpea$EVOVTO OE avToifj 1tal. Afilpt,ijfj, ~ µ.17Tpo7roA.ir:; 
"'A~ I ....... ~, ,, ' 
TCAJV a1teoaiµ.oviwv, TCAJJJ avTc.1w oeoµ.evoi· V1l"O ryap 
"' 0 t I \ I \ t "'8 I t I 4 TCAJV t.Ta£CAJV /Cat, QVTOL e.,. E£POVTO. alCOVCTaVTE~ 
~· f .L\ ~ I I '9 \ t I 
OE 0, alCEOatµ.ovtOL ryvwµ.rw ££XOV T1JV Q11"0£1C£av 
' I ... T I Q ,, ' ... 
EIC7rEp.7rEL'JI, TO£fj TE pa xiviotfj JJOUl\.oµ,evo' /Cat, TO£~_ 
At11pieva1. Tlµ.OJpeiv. · 
(3.92.1-4) 
22 "It was about this time that the Lakedaimonians 
established Herakleia, their colony in Trachinia, with the 
following object in view. The people of Malis, considered as 
a whole, consist of three divisions, Paralians, Hiereans and 
Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians after they had been 
ruined in war by their neighbors, the Oitaians, at first 
intended to attach themselves to the Athenians, but, fearing 
that these might not be loyal, sent to Lakedaimon, choosing 
Teisamenos as their envoy. And envoys from Doris, the mother 
city of the Lakedaimonians, also took part in the embassy, 
making the same request, for they too were being ruined by the 
Oitaians. After hearing their appeal, the Lakedaimonians were 
of the opinion that they should send out the colony, wishing 
to aid both the Trachinians and the Dorians" (3.92.1-4 tr. 
C.F. Smith). 
11 
According to Diodoros, the purpose of the foundation was 
as follows: 23 
3 "Aµ.a SE 'TOVTocs 1Tpa'TToµ.€voLS' AaKeOatµ.ovtoL 
~v Tpaxiva KaAouµ.€v71v ceKtaav Kat µ.e'Twvoµ.aaaJ' 
... , \ I \ 'I I 1' I 
4 'II paKAEtav Sta TotauTaS" TLVaS' ac.TtaS'. paxwc.oc. 
' 0 ' ' r ' " " \ \ ' S 'TT AE 1Tpoi; . LTaLOUS' oµ.opoUS' OVTaS' ETTJ 1TOl\l\Q. C.E 0 -
' ' \ , - \ - , 'Q- \ µ.ouv KaL TOUS' 'ITl\ELOUS' TWV 11'0/\LTWV a.'TTE,...aJ\OV •. 
£p~fLOU s· OVC1TJS' TijS' 7TOAEWS' ~glwaav AaKEOac.-
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Unlike Diodoros, Thukydides, gives additional reasons for 
the foundation:24 ' " .. ' 'AO ' . Kac. aµa TOU 7rpoS" 17va1.ov: 
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3.92.4 
23 "While these events were taking place, the 
Lakedaimonians colonized Trachis, as it was called, and 
renamed it Herakleia, for the following reasons: the 
Trachinians had been at war with the neighboring Oitaians for 
many years and had lost the larger number of their citizens. 
Since the city was deserted, they thought it proper that the 
Lakedaimonians who were colonists from Trachis, should assume 
the care of it. And the Lakedaimonians, both because of their 
kinship and because Herakles, their ancestor, in ancient times 
had made his home in Trachis, decided to make it a great city" 
(Diod. 12.59.3-4 tr.C.H. Oldfather). 
24 "At the same time, the site of the proposed city seemed 
to them well adapted for carrying on the war against Athens; 
for a fleet could be equipped there for an attack upon Euboia 
and the crossing thus made from a short distance away, and the 
place would also be useful for expeditions along the coast 
towards Thrace. In short, they were eager to found the 
settlement" (3.92.4 tr. C.F. Smith). 
12 
Thus, Thukydides informs us, almost parenthetically, that 
the Spartans were also eager to found Herakleia because the 
site of the proposed city seemed to them well adapted for 
carrying on the war against Athens, offering as the first 
reason that a fleet could be equipped there for an attack upon 
Euboia (3.92.4). 
Thukydides discusses the Athenians' concern with the use 
of Herakleia as a naval base: 25 
XCiiI. Ol Se • A8·rwaio' riji; '7TOAE{.c)~ TavT7Ji; 
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(3.93.1) 
Evidently, the Athenians' fears were real. Euboia was a 
rich and important island, situated on the principal route for 
Athenian ships sailing to the Hellespont (Kagan 1969:124) and 
paying sizable tribute to Athens (2.14; 8.9.52). Its loss as 
an ally would indeed be ominous for Athens and would place an 
intolerable strain on the empire. 26 • 
25 "As for the Athenians, while the colonists were being 
gathered for this city, they at first became alarmed, thinking 
it was being established chiefly as a menace to Euboia, 
because it is only a short distance across from here to 
Kenaion in Euboia" {3.93.1 tr. C.F. Smith). 
26 The immediacy with which Perikles responded to the 
revolt of Euboia in 446 attests to its importance to Athens 
{l.113.3; 1.114.1; Plut. Per. 22.1)). 
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Yet, according to Thukydides, no harm ever came to Euboia 
from the colony: 27 
E71"ELTa µivToi 7rapa ooeav avToir; -a1ri/3rr ov 7ti.p 
J I t I , "" ~ \ t~I 
2 E"fC:VETO t.L71" aUTTJr; OElVOV ouoev. 
(3.93.1) 
There is no evidence that Herakleia was ever used by the 
Spartans as a base for naval operations (Kelly 1987:49); in 
fact, a Spartan naval assault from Herakleia would have been 
unrealistic in view of Sparta's previous experiences with the 
Athenian fleet (Kagan 1974:196). 
If the naval docks were built at all, an issue to be 
discussed below, they did not reflect the intention of the 
Spartans who relied traditionally on the army, rather than a 
navy, to accomplish military objectives. 28 In giving primary 
strategic importance to Herakleia as a naval base, Thukydides 
may have reflected his own fears, rather than the intention of 
the Spartans. His obsession with the importance of naval power 
pervades his Histories29 and may have colored his assessment 
v "Afterwards, however, the matter turned out contrary 
to their expectations; for no harm came from the city" (3. 93 .1 
tr. C.F. Smith). 
28 It took the Athenians a long time to appreciate the 
threat that Herakleia posed for them in Thrace (Gomme 
1965b: 398). 
29 The following are among the numerous references made 
by Thukydides in Book I to sea power and its importance: in 
earlier days there was no land commerce (implying communica-
tions were all by sea) (1.2.2); Minos, by being the first to 
acquire a navy, made himself master of the Hellenic Sea 
(1.4.1); commerce and surplus revenues gained by cities 
founded on the sea permitted them to thrive (1.71); wealth of 
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of Sparta's purpose. Thus, Thukydides' statement that 
Herakleia was intended as a naval base against Euboia is 
debatable. We may even speculate whether his statement that 
the colony would also serve as a land base for Thrace was a 
revision made by him only after Brasidas' march to Thrace in 
424 had made Sparta's intent patent. 30 
islanders seemed to depend on seafaring and the establishment 
of safe navigation by Minos (1.8.2); Agamemnon was able to 
assemble his fleet because he surpassed all other princes in 
power ( 1. 9 .1) ; Pelops acquired his power by reason of the 
great \\1aalth brought back (by ships) from Asia ( 1. 9 .1); 
Agamemnon ruled over many islands by virtue of his fleet 
(1.9.4); Agamemnon's fleet in Troy had 1200 ships (1.9.4); as 
the Hellenes became more powerful and wealthy, they began to 
fit out navies and apply themselves to the sea (1.1.3.1); the 
earliest sea fight of record was between the Corinthians and 
Korkyrans (1.13.3); Hellenes in olden days communicated with 
one another more by sea than by land (1.1.3.5); the 
Corinthians raised their city to great power, when they 
acquired ships and offered a market by sea ( 1.13. 5) ; the 
Ionians, by acquiring a powerful navy, kept control of the sea 
from the Persians (1.13.6); the Phokaians, colonizing 
Massalla, conquered the Carthaginians in a sea fight 1.13.6); 
the development of the trireme was made by the tyrants in 
Sicily and Korkyra shortly before the Persian War (1.14.3); 
until the Persian War most ships, including the Athenian, con-
sisted only of 50 oars ( 1.14. 3) ; no expeditions by land 
resulted in accession of power, only expeditions by sea 
(1.15.2); Darius was able to enslave the islands because of 
his possession of the Phoenician fleet (1.16); the Athenians 
became sailors, when in response to the Persian attacks, they 
abandoned their city and boarded ships ( 1. 18. 2) ; Athens 
emerged as the most powerful naval force after the Persian War 
(1.18.2); Athens maintained her hegemony by taking over the 
ships of allied cities (1.19)). 
30 Thukydides might have kept contemporary diaries of the 
war which he later revised and "subordinated to a considered 
design of the work as a whole" (Gemme 5 1981: 384). The 
passages describing the foundation of the colony (3.92-3) also 
ref er to the Boiotian control of the colony and the expulsion 
of Agesippidas, ca. 419 (5.51-52.1; Gemme 5 1981:408) The 
question whether the stated purpose of the colony as a roadway 
to Thrace may have been a textual revision made after 
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Modern commentaries: Purpose of Herakleia 
Modern commentators appear divided in their assessment of 
Herakleia's value to Sparta as a passage to Thrace, a reason 
to which Thukydides apparently assigned secondary importance. 
Representative examples will suffice. 
According to Georg Grote "the passage of troops against 
the subject-allies of Athens in Thrace, would also be 
facilitated" by such a colony (Grote 6.308). A. W. Gomme notes 
that Sparta was exploring other means to win the war by a sea 
attack and "a distant expedition by land" (Gomme 1956b:395), 
clearly a reference to Thrace. Donald Kagan suggests that the 
Spartans intended to expand the land war into Thrace, which is 
underscored by his consideration of the sea campaign as 
unrealistic (Kagan 1974: 196). Hermann Bengtson hedges his 
position by stating that Herakleia would provide the Spartans 
a base against Central Greece (Bengtson 1988: 141). F. E. 
Adcock does not mention the threat to Euboia at all, and 
suggests that the entire Thracian project was an 
opportunistic afterthought of Brasidas' adventurism, 
implemented in 424 only through fear of a Helot uprising 
(Adcock CAH 5:243). According to J.B. Bury and R. Meiggs, 
Euboia was the primary purpose for the foundation of the 
colony, and Chalkidike, the secondary; Thrace is not even 
mentioned (Bury 1975:265). In N. G. L. Hammond's view the 
Brasidas' campaign in 424 is unanswered. 
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primary purpose for the foundation of the colony was a base 
from which "to push northward to join hands with the 
chalcidians and Bottiaeans"; and the secondary purpose an 
attack on Euboia (Hammond 1986:361). Simon Hornblower suggests 
that the two motives Thukydides gives are "not quite enough on 
their own to explain the giant size of the colony", but fails 
to offer any other reason (Hornblower 1991:505). P. A. Brunt 
alone appears unequivocal in recognizing that the purpose of 
the colony was "to attack the only part of Athens' empire 
which they could reach by land, the Thracian districts" (Brunt 
JCAC 1965:265-266). 
Among contemporary commentators one intriguing suggestion 
has been raised by G. Bockisch, according to whom Sparta's 
purpose for the foundation of Herakleia was the creation of a 
new territory of perioikoi in Central Greece (Bockisch AA 
1967:311-317). She cites overpopulation at home as a reason, 
but the assumption of an expansionistic policy for Sparta in 
the Archidamian War is not supported by the evidence presented 
and must be rejected. 31 
31 In Bockisch' s earlier publication "Harmostai" (Klio 46 
1965:129-23(9), she suggested that Spartan imperialism was 
Sparta's motive in colonizing the fertile, plains of Malis, 
citing Lysander's actions, as an example of Spartan policy. 
The assumption that the post-Peloponnesian War reality of 
Spartan imperialism motivated Sparta while in a grim struggle 
for survival with Athens, a half century earlier, is highly 
questionable. Furthermore, the first mention of Sparta's use 
of harmosts is not until 412, when Agis provided a harmost for 
the Lesbians (8.5.2.; Gomme 1956b:623). 
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If we accept that the purpose of the colony was a base to 
Thrace, a problem arises, nevertheless, because the ancient 
sources lack details necessary to identify the parodos, or 
passage, from the Peloponnese to the Malian Gulf and from 
there to Thrace, along which Herakleia was situated. 
Modern commentators, unaware of the Isthmus Corridor 
route, have mistakenly concluded that only the coastal road by 
Thermopylai provided such an access, 32 and the strategic 
purpose of Herakleia was to secure this coastal road.n G. 
a. Grundy and Johannes Kromayer both considered Herakleia a 
necessary factor in the defense of Thermopylai (Grundy 
1901:264, 268 n.; Kromayer 1907:137). 
such a single-minded focus on Thermopylai, supported by 
indirect references in ancient sources, 34 has formed the 
communis opinio expressed by Grundy who explicitly states that 
no road for military use into Central Greece existed west of 
Thermopylai (Grundy 1901:267 n.). Grundy also concluded that 
32 These commentators follow Herodotos' description of the 
Persian advance to Thermopylai and his reference to the 
impassable mountains along the southern rim of the Malian Gulf 
(Hdt. 7 .176, 7. 198) . Macan 1908: I, 399; How-Wells 1928: 
2. 233; Burn 1962: 425; Grundy 1901: 362; Munro CAH IV 301; 
Hignett 1963; Pritchett 1985:193; Begtson 1988:101. Cf. 
Szemler GICR 62. 
33 stahlin RE 424.68-425.9; Bury 1975:366; Pritchett 
1985:190 ff.) 
34 Herodotos' reference to Trachis (Hdt. 7 .199), the 
identification by Diodoros of Trachis with Herakleia (Died. 
12. 59. 3), and the location of the site forty stades from 
Thermopylai by Thukydides (3. 92. 6) and six stades from Trachis 
by Strabo (Strabo 9.4.13). 
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Herakleia effectively defended the environs of Mt. Oite by 
commanding the passes through the Asopos gorge to the wide 
upland plain of Mandritsa (Grundy 1901:264}, an assumption 
which has been proved impossible (Szemler GICR 61}. Kromayer 
also believed Herakleia's importance was in part based on its 
command of the canyon of the Asopos gorge (Kromayer 1907:140}. 
According to William Martin Leake, Herakleia "commanded 
the passes from Thessaly into Southern Greece, as well along 
the shore by Thermopylae into Locris, as over Mount Oeta into 
Doris"; but in a later passage he makes it clear that the 
Asopos gorge is the north-south passage into Central Greece 
west of Thermopylai (Leake 1835:30-31}. 
J. A. R. Munro was, perhaps, the first to question that 
Thermopylai furnished the sole route to Central Greece, and 
suggests, but does not further identify, a route west of the 
Asopos gorge (Munro 1902:292 ff.; Szemler GICR 63/64 n. 
12). 35 Subsequent investigators, too, sought to define other 
penetration routes west of the Asopos (Kromayer-Veith 1903-
31: 2 .127; and 4.54/55; Farrel 1910:116/117; Kolias 1933: 72 
ff.; Burn 1977:98; ff.; MacKay 1963:241-45; Wallace 1980:15 
ff.; Pritchett 1982: 220 ff.}, but did not connect their 
suggested routes with Herakleia. 
35 Munro states that the citadel of Trachis (later 
identified as the site of Herakleia} must have been occupied 
by the Greeks in 480 to bar the Persians the route through the 
Asopos gorge to Doris (JHS 22, 1902, 313 n. 31}. 
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some scholars recognized the topographical difficulties 
and the logistical impracticability of Herakleia controlling 
Thermopylai. They concluded that Herakleia was not the key to 
the security of Thermopylai. They saw the value of this 
fortification in its command of an alternate route, or routes, 
into central Greece and Doris, from which easy access to the 
Kephissos valley or the Corinthian Gulf was available (Cary CQ 
1922:98/99; Bequignon 1937:254; Andrewes 1978:96 ff.; 
Hornblower 1991:505). In their reassessments, however, they 
concluded, without exception, that the Asopos gorge and 
Thermopylai were the only principal entrances into Central 
Greece. This reassessment is best summed up by Yves Bequignon 
(1937:38): 
Dans l'antiquite, comme a l'epoque moderne, 
la vallee du Spercheios ne communique avec les 
pays plus meridionaux que par deux passages: 
l'Asopos et les Thermopyles 
These investigators were generally unaware of the 
existence of the Corridor road system, and therefore, did not 
grasp its close topographical connection with Herakleia. 
Although Friedrich Stahlin incorrectly connected Herakleia 
with the control and defense of Thermopylai, 36 he is the only 
36 "H. beherrscht durch seine Lage den Durchgang durch die 
Thermopylen und war aus diesem Grunde ein von den 
Lakedaimoniern (Thuc. III 92), von Iason van Pherai (Xen. 
hell. VI 4, 27) und den Aitolern (Paus. X 20, 9) begehrter 
Punkt. H. schliesst zugleich den wichtigen Weg ab, der von 
Mittelgriechenland und dem Kephissostal Uber den niedrigen 
Oitessal und durch das Asopostal filhrte, Strab. VIII 389. 
Diesen Passilbergang beniltzt die heutige Kunststrasse und die 
Eisenbahn." stahlin RE 8:424-25. 
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one to recognize the northern entrance to the corridor at Ohio 
vouna as the connecting link to Oite from the Spercheios river 
valley (RE 5A:2401.63), as well as the strategic unity of the 
Thermopylai-Ohema defensive line (RE 5A:2401.21-28). 
The Phokis-Ooris Expedition, in which this writer was 
privileged to participate, discovered and explored this 
northern entrance to the Corridor at Ohema and its road system 
located within a natural passage of passes and upland plains 
through Central Greece, connecting the Malian and Corinthian 
Gulfs. 37 This Isthmus Corridor, traversing a distance of ca. 
37 linear km or ca. 80 km by existing roads, from Amphissa on 
the south to the environs of the Malian plain on the north, is 
the only easily negotiable, all-season, well defined road 
system capable of supporting north-south military and 
migratory movements through Central Greece (Kase & Szemler 
1982:357 ff.). The discovery of the Great Isthmus Corridor 
route revealed the immense importance of the Ohio Vouna-
Thermoyplai line as a defensive barrier to Central Greece 
(Szemler GICR 60-64). Herakleia, connected topographically 
with the Corridor route and controlling not only its northern 
entrance, the Ohema Gap, but also, all overland movements 
between Thessaly and Central Greece, was a main component of 
this road system. Therefore, the reasons for its foundation by 
the Spartans and its impact on events in the Archidamian War 
must be reassessed. 
37 Kase, E.W. and Szemler, G. 1982; id. GICR 60-64. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SPARTA IN CENTRAL GREECE 
Sparta had an interest in Central Greece long before the 
Archidamian War. 38 Precedent was established for such inter-
vention when the Spartans sent troops to assist Doris, their 
metropolis (Tyrtaios Anth. Gr., Diehl 19433·2), in Central 
Greece thirty years earlier in an armed conflict, which one 
may properly entitle the First Peloponnesian War. 39 Sparta 
had also attempted before the War to expand her influence in 
the Delphic Amphiktyony. 40 The documented presence of 
Spartan forces in Central Greece before the Archidamian War 
precludes the possibility of Spartan ignorance about the 
38 Among the aggressive actions taken by Sparta outside 
the Peloponnese before the Archidamian War were the campaign 
in Boiotia in 519 (Hdt. 6.108), and in Attica to expel the 
Pisistradids in 511 (Hdt. 5.63), and the expedition to 
Thessaly in 470 (Hdt. 6.72). See Hornblower 1991:503. 
39 In 457, following a Phokian attack on Doris, Sparta 
sent hoplites to aid the Dorians and force the Phokians to 
make peace (1.107.2). With the job done, the Spartans returned 
home; there was no attempt made at that time to found a 
permanent base. 
4° For fifth century evidence of Spartan interest in the 
Amphiktyony consider Sparta's unsuccessful attempt to exclude 
all Greeks who had medized (Plut. Them. 20); also Spartan 
intervention in Central Greece in the Second Sacred War 
( 1. 112) • A desire to expand influence in the Amphiktyonic 
League by gaining control of one of the Trachinian votes has 
been offered as a motive for the foundation of the colony, 
although there is no evidence that Sparta exercised this vote 
until 343 (Hornblower 1991:168,502). 
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corridor road system which, before the opening of 
Thermopylai, 41 was the only route connecting the two centers 
of the Amphiktyony, Anthele and Delphi. Thus, we must safely 
assume that during the formulation of the new strategic plans, 
the Spartans were aware of this road system, and they 
considered the strategic and tactical difficulties, as well as 
the possibilities, that a fortified eagle's nest at the north 
end of the Corridor could offer. They properly concluded that 
a colony anchored at this juncture was expedient not only for 
expansion into Central Greece, but toward Thessaly and Thrace 
as well. 
To implement these plans the Spartans were confronted 
with five problems. They had to: 
1. select an overland route to the new colony; 
2. establish control over the small ethne along this 
route, either through political negotiation or military 
action; 
3. gain the approval of Delphi for colonizing a new site; 
4. ascertain the suitability of the site to build a 
colony; and 
5. secure and fortify the site for execution of their 
strategic plans. 
41 An issue to be discussed below, p. 55. 
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Lifeline to the New Colony: The Corridor's Road System 
The Spartans had two basic choices for a route to Doris 
and the proposed site of Herakleia. One route to the new 
colony could begin at the north coast of the Peloponnese, from 
which a short ferry trip across the Corinthian Gulf would lead 
to the south terminus of the Corridor at Kirrha. 42 
Although Athens was mistress of the sea throughout the 
Archidamian War, 43 Sparta's numerous allies with about 100 
triremes, most of which were Corinthian-built for the Korkyran 
campaign, made the Lakedaimonian fleet a significant force44 
(Busolt GGIII 2 863-864; Hammond 1986:345}. Spartan influence 
was especially dominant in the eastern Corinthian Gulf. Athens 
had relinquished Pegai, Megara's port on the Corinthian Gulf, 
to Sparta in 446 under the terms of the Thirty Years Peace 
0 In 457, the Spartans, going to Doris to assist against 
a Phokian invasion (1.107.1-2; Died. 2.79}, most probably made 
a sea crossing from the Peloponnese to Kirrha (Gemme 
1956a:314; Ste. Croix 1972:190-95; Szemler GICR 116; contra 
Hammond 1986:294). This same route was probably used by the 
Spartans in the Second Sacred War in 449 (1.112.5}. After 429, 
the Athenian naval base at Naupaktos dominated the western end 
of the Corinthian Gulf and, undoubtedly, the Rhion-Antirhion 
crossing, ca. 9 km to the southwest of Naupaktos. A 
disembarkation point in Central Greece further east of 
Naupaktos would be a necessity for the Spartans. 
43 At the beginning of the War Athens had a fleet of 300 
triremes, aside from those furnished by Chics, Lesbos and 
Korkyra (2.13.8; Bengtson 1988:137}. 
44 Although Athens' base at Naupaktos and Phormio's 
brilliant victories in 429 may have dashed the hopes of the 
Spartans at sea and restricted their passage from the Gulf to 
the Ionian sea (Hammond 1986:355; contra Kelly 1987:25-54}, 
there is no evidence that within the eastern half of the Gulf 
traffic was seriously affected by the Athenian victories. 
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(1.115~1). Corinth, Sikyon and Pellene in Achaia, three of the 
seven allies of Sparta who furnished ships for the 
peloponnesian fleet {2. 9. 3), were situated in the eastern 
corinthian Gulf. 45 Thus, we must assume that Lakedaimonian 
troops could be ferried safely across the Gulf to Kirrha and 
to the Corridor's road system from more than one location on 
the north-eastern coast of the Peloponnese. 
An alternate route for the Spartans, avoiding the 
transfer across the Gulf, would be a re la ti vely long, and 
possibly dangerous, overland journey through the Megarid, 
Boiotia and Phokis (or from the Megarid into Attica and then 
into Boiotia), and then, along the Kephissos river to the 
Dorian metropolis. 
Since the Megarid is the only gateway by land from the 
Peloponnese to Central Greece, its strategic importance to 
both sides cannot be exaggerated. 46 Mt. Geraneia stretches 
45 Pellene, the easternmost of the twelve Achaian cities 
and a neighbor to Sikyon, had become an ally of Sparta at the 
beginning of the Archidamian War. It often acted independently 
of the other Achaian cities and on other occasions sided with 
Corinth and Sikyon {Gemme 1956b:lO). By 429 Oyme, the 
westernmost city of Achaia, had probably also joined the 
Spartans. Knemos' ships fled to Dyme following Phormio's naval 
victory {2.84.4; Paus. 7.6.1), suggesting that the city was 
friendly to the Spartans (Gomme 1956b:219). The rest of the 
Achaians, although neutral at the beginning of the war, later 
sided with the Lakedaimonians {2.9.2). 
46 It was the friendship of Megara with Sparta that 
determined the plans of campaign of both sides at the 
beginning of the war (Henderson 1927:4). It has been suggested 
that the Megarian Decrees of 432 were intended by Athens as an 
economic weapon to force Megara to resume her alliance with 
Athens. For a discussion of different views on this matter, 
see Kagan 1969:260-264, esp. n. 36). 
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athwart this peninsula, a distance of about eight miles, from 
the Corinthian Gulf on the northwest to the Saronic Gulf on 
the southeast. This range, with ridges as high as 1200 m, 
forms a relatively easily defensible boundary separating the 
Megarid from Corinth.u Megara had been an ally of Athens 
since 460, when, threatened by Corinth, she turned to Athens 
for support (1.103.4; Hammond 1986:292). The alliance with 
Megara, the first step in the so-called First Peloponnesian 
war, afforded Athens protection from invasions from the 
Peloponnese. 48 Following Athens' defeat at Koroneia in 447, 
47 There are only three routes, other than mule paths, 
that traverse this range. On the northwest a coastal road 
follows the Corinthian Gulf around the west end of the 
mountains to Pegai, the port of Megara, whence it continues 
north to Aigosthena, also on the gulf, and then into Boiotia. 
On the south another route follows the precipitous coast of 
the Saronic Gulf along the Skironian Way around the east end 
of the Geraneia range to Megara, whence it continues along the 
coast to Eleusis in Attica. Only one route goes through the 
Geraneia range by a pass leading to Tripodiskos from where 
there is an easy passage to Megara (Henderson 1927:55-56). 
48 It was at this time that Athens built the Long Walls 
from Megara to Nisaia. By controlling Pegai on the Corinthian 
Gulf and Megara, passage through the Geraneia range could be 
interdicted (Henderson 1927:56). When Sparta intervened in 
Central Greece in 457 to aid Doris, Sparta was barred from 
returning to the Peloponnese via the Megarid, because Athens 
held Pegai and Megara and picketed the pass in the Geraneia 
mountains. Sparta was forced to retreat to Boiotia (1.108.1). 
Pegai also furnished Athens a base to extend her influence in 
the Corinthian Gulf. 
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Megara revolted from Athenian domination (1.114.1). 49 After 
the Thirty Years' Peace in 446/445, Athens was also forced to 
surrender Pegai and Nisaia. As the prospects of continued war 
with Sparta ballooned, a renewed Athenian control of Megara 
became a strategic necessity. 
The corridor's south sector50 
Both the overland route via the Megarid, Boiotia, and 
Phokis, as well as the sea route through Kirrha, had to 
converge through the Central Sector of the Great Isthmus 
Corridor, 51 the only expedient way to Doris (Hammond 
1986:361; Kase GICR 21-22). The city of Kytinion in 
particular, situated in southeast Doris, occupied an eminently 
49 The Megarians revolted, while Perikles was putting 
down the revolt in Euboia. The Five Year Peace with Sparta had 
just expired, and with the Megarid open to them, the Spartans 
invaded and ravaged Attica. King Pleistoanax and his troops 
advanced as far as the Thriasian plains, but withdrew upon 
Perikles' return from Euboia. (1.114; Diod. 12.5; Plut. Per. 
22.1-2). 
so The topographic designations of PDE (Kase GICR 21) will 
be used throughout. The South Sector of the Corridor route 
extended ca. 29 linear km from the Gulf of Itea and the plain 
of Krissa on the south to the Gravia pass on the north. 
Passing Amphissa the road continued by the low Mouchikri pass 
to the Vinianni valley and then through the Ambliani pass 
before reaching Gravia (Kase & Szemler 1982:356). 
51 The Central Sector of the Corridor extended from the 
pass at Gravia (between the Parnassos and the Ghiona 
mountains) on the south to the modern village of Oiti on the 
north and encompassed the upper Kephissos river valley, i.e. 
ancient Doris (Kase GICR 21-22). 
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strategic position on the Phokian-Dorian frontier. 52 Sparta's 
new strategy required control of Kytinion and its environs to 
maintain the stability of the Corridor route through Central 
Greece to Herakleia. 
If the Spartans chose the short ferry ride across the 
Gulf, the route would be quicker, safer, tactically brilliant 
and unexpected and, thus, more decisive. Furthermore, from 
Krissa they could pass unhindered through the South Sector of 
the Corridor to Doris. Amphissa, the dominant city in Ozolian 
Lokris, was a Spartan ally (Died. 12.42.4); thus, the 
allegiance of most of the Ozolian Lokrians to Athens (Gemme 
1956b:ll) would not be a significant impediment to passage 
through the South Sector and the deployment of Spartan forces 
in Doris and Oitaia. 53 
52 Kytinion, identified as the local site of Tsouka 
Khlomou, is located about 1 km north of the pass at Gravia, 
guarding the entrance to this pass and controlling both of the 
routes which pass through Doris (Wallace GICR 53/54; Hammond 
1986: 361). The importance of this site in relation to the 
Corridor and the affairs in Central Greece is attested in 
ancient history (e.g., as the target of Phokian aggression in 
457, 1.107.2; and a target of Philip II's campaign in Central 
Greece in 339, Aeschin. 3.140; Dem. 18-169-179; Died. 
16.84.1). 
The importance of this site for the control of the 
Corridor is demonstrated by the campaigns of Demosthenes in 
Central Greece in 426 (3.94.2-3.98) discussed below. 
53 In 426 Eurylochos had no trouble in getting the 
Myonians, Ipneans, Messapians, Tolophonians, Eupaliones, 
Oineones, and other Ozolian Lokrian tribes, to cooperate with 
him in his campaign against Naupaktos, subduing some and 
taking hostages in others to get them out of their Athenian 
alliances (3.101.2; Hornblower 1991:515/516). 
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The Corridor' Central Sector 
obviously, the Spartans must have been aware of the 
obstacles with which, at any time, they might be confronted in 
their passage through the Megarid, Boiotia and Phokis. The 
Phokians' attitude toward any such Spartan move was especially 
critical. The tribal state of Phokis extended westward from 
soiotia along the Kephissos river to Dor is. 54 Within this 
land-locked valley in Phokis, wedged between Mt. Parnassos on 
the south and Mt. Kallidromos on the north, the overland route 
via the Megarid and Boiotia made its way westward to join the 
Great Isthmus Corridor route. 55 
Phokis had a longstanding friendship with Athens which 
began shortly after the Persian War. 56 At the outbreak of 
54 The Catalogue of Ships attests to the unity of the 
Phokians, but also to the existence of numerous cities (Il. 
2.517-23). To the Phokian tribal state cf. Schober 1924:55. 
Before the Thessalian conquest, and probably stimulated by it, 
in the seventh and sixth centuries, there is Phokian 
representation in the Amphiktyonic League (Larsen 1967:43-44). 
The minting of Phokian coinage suggests a federal organization 
(Head 1911:338). No single city dominated the whole (Larsen 
1967:43), but each reserved some independence of action. 
55 The overland route through Phokis joined the Great 
Isthmus Corridor route in Doris, ca. 1 km south of the modern 
village of Oiti (Kase GICR 30). 
56 The Phokians had allied themselves with the Athenians, 
as "the acclaimed winners at Sestos, the new, powerful star of 
the Aegean" (Szemler GICR 116). In 457 following the battle of 
Oinophytai, Myronides subdued the whole of Phokis, as well as 
Opuntian Lokris (1.108.3; Died. 11.83.2), an indication that 
perhaps this early alliance had eroded. In 454/453 Phokis, 
prompted by her enmity to Sparta, Thebes and Thessaly (Hammond 
1986: 396), concluded another alliance with Athens (Kagan 
1969:120). In 449, in the Sacred War, Sparta intervened in 
Central Greece and took control of the sacred precinct of 
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the peloponnesian War, however, Phokis was allied with Sparta 
(Diod. 12.42.4;1.9.2; 2. 9. 3) • 
57 Since the Phokian 
confederation had no central control, this alliance was 
tenuous. The western Phokians might at any time rejoin Athens 
if the opportunity arose (3.95.1) , 58 or Phokian aggression 
might at any time expand into the central Sector and def eat 
Sparta's plans. For the Spartans to maintain uninterrupted 
control of the Corridor's Central Sector it was necessary to 
keep the Phokians in check, either by alliance or force. This 
factor greatly influenced military events in Central Greece 
after the Archidamian War began. 
In response to the destructive Spartan raids on Attica, 
and after Spartan troops withdrew to winter quarters, Athens 
cautiously began invading the Megarid, once or twice a year 
Apollo from the Phokians and delivered it to the Delphians. 
Athens then, in 447, in a show of strength, restored the 
temple to the Phokians (1.112.5). Athenian influence in the 
area continued, even extending to the capture of Chaironeia in 
Boiotia (Hammond 1986: 308). After the decisive defeat of 
Athens at Koroneia in 446, Athenian aspirations for 
continental power in Central Greece ended. She was forced to 
evacuate Boiotia and, without Boiotia, Phokis, as well as 
Opuntian Lokris, became untenable (Kagan 1969:124). In these 
circumstances Phokis was forced to join the Spartan League 
soon after the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Treaty between 
Sparta and Athens (Hammond 1986:311). 
57 The geographical isolation of Phokis and its exposure 
to the growing Boiotian influence had strengthened Sparta's 
hand in gaining this alliance (Gomme 1956b:402). 
~ The split in allegiance between eastern and western 
Phokians was demonstrated in the third century, when the 
eastern Phokians allied with Antigonos Doson in 224 and with 
Philip V in 219, while the western Phokians, allied with the 
Aitolians, blocked the Dhema-Thermopylai defensive line (Pol. 
2.52.7; Larsen 1968:19-20). 
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(2 .31.:3;4.66.1; Gemme 1956b:93). Since these annual raids into 
the Megarid occurred only after the Spartan armies had 
retreated to the Peloponnese, there was no risk to the 
Athenian hoplites, nor any inconsistency with the declared 
periklean strategy of fighting a defensive war. 
Thukydides does not give us any explanation for these 
military actions or raids, but evidence suggests a purpose 
other than mere harassment. The 431 invasion, for instance, 
involved the largest army of Athenians ever assembled 
(2.31.2). The size of this army belies a purpose limited to 
the devastation of the Megarian countryside. 59 Continued 
aggressive military action in the Megarid suggests that Athens 
must have been aware of Sparta's new strategic plans, probably 
through its spies or contacts at Delphi. 
After the death of Perikles in 429, these raids 
intensified. His absence from the strategia appears to have 
strengthened the role of the faction seeking aggressive 
action. 60 In fact, between 429 and 426 Athens abandoned her 
59 Other explanations offered for the campaigns are 
sanctions imposed against Megara for religious misdeeds and a 
grudge entertained by Perikles against the city (Plut. Per. 
30.2-3; Adcock, CAH 5:198-99). 
60 Some scholars state that a change in the membership of 
the strategia in 426 put the war faction in control (West 
1924:201; Beloch 1931:324). Others have suggested that the 
strategia in 426/25 had the same mixture of radicals and 
moderates as in previous years, and that the change in 
strategy was due not to politics but to policy (Gomme 
1956b:195; Kagan 1974:187-88; Bengtson 1988;141). 
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strategy of attrition, the "Ermattungs-strategie" of Hans 
oelbrilck (Delbrilck, 1957:139 ff.) in favor of more aggressive 
• • 61 policies. Athenian tactical moves suggest such an 
awareness. 
In 427 Athens captured the island of Minoa, taking a 
major, decisive step to regain control of the Megarid. 62 The 
island was garrisoned, and Nisaia, Megara's port on the 
Corinthian Gulf, was effectively blockaded {Hammond 
1986:360) . 63 
But Sparta did not remain inactive. Under the command of 
Archidamos, the Spartans attacked Plataiai in 429 {2.71.1), 
probably about the same time when they decided to found 
Herakleia. Thukydides gives no reason why the Spartans 
61 Among the aggressive campaigns of Athens in this period 
were the quelling of the revolt in Mytelene (3 .18. 4-5); 
intervention in Sicily to aid Leontini (3.88); the garrison at 
Minoa (3.51); intervention in Korkyra (3.69-85); attack on 
Melos and the Lokrian coast (3.91); Demosthenes in Leukas and 
Aitolia (3.94-98); defeat of Peloponnesians at Olpai (3.105-
115). 
62 Minoa, now a hill on the mainland, but in the fifth 
century an island at the entrance to the harbor of Nisaia, was 
captured by Nikias. The use of the island as a watch station 
for traffic in and out of Nisaia is the only reason Thukydides 
gives for the Athenian action (3.51). 
63 In 424, two years after Herakleia was founded, and 
while Brasidas' armies were preparing for a march to Thrace, 
Athens captured Nisaia, again resuming a campaign, 
unsuccessfully, to gain control of the Megarid. Since the 
Athenians had believed erroneously that the capture of this 
port would compel the surrender of Megara ( 4. 69 .1), the 
Athenians did not pursue the invasion of the Megarid (2.31.3). 
Megara, however, remained allied with Sparta, and passage to 
Central Greece through Megara's land routes remained open to 
the Lakedaimonian armies. 
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undertook this protracted siege to capture the city, but its 
importance for the free passage of Spartan armies to Central 
Greece must not be overlooked.M 
Plataiai is situated on the north slope of the Kithairon 
range which, continuous with the Parnes range to the east, 
forms the border between Boiotia on the north and Attica and 
the Megarid on the south. Any troop movements into Boiotia 
from Attica would be exposed to a flank attack at Plataiai. 65 
The only other road which enters Boiotia from the south 
follows the coast of the Corinthian Gulf from the Megarid 
around the west end of the Kithairon range, and it is also 
M The strategic importance of the site has been 
generally accepted {Grundy 1901:110-116; Busolt 1926:964; 
especially, Henderson 1927:73-74; Adcock, CAH 5:211). Kagan, 
conceding its importance, states there is no evidence that 
control by Athens would disrupt Sparta's communication with 
Boiotia, and he concludes that Sparta's need for such a land 
campaign was doubtful {1974:102-3). Grote suggests a desire 
for revenge against Plataiai for the execution of Theban 
prisoners (2.6.4) caused Sparta to act (1907:6.213). J.B. Bury 
states Plataiai commanded the road from Megara to Thebes 
{1963: 410). 
M There are only three passes through these mountains 
suitable for troop movements from Attica into Boiotia: 
Dekalea, on the route from Athens to Oropos on the Euripos; 
Phyle, running northwesterly, and the most direct route from 
Athens to Thebes; and Dryoskephalai, which pierces the 
Ki thairon range into Boiotia about eight miles south of 
Thebes. Plataiai is situated on a junction road a few miles to 
the west of the Dryoskephalai pass. The important defensive 
outposts of Attica, Cine and Eleuthera, are si tuate.d on this 
route a few miles to the south of the pass. _,,.<{(,•\\ '· 1 
l1"'4 ..... .• t. 
33 
exposed to attack from Plataiai. 66 The road from Boiotia led 
through the relatively narrow pass at Parapotamioi to 
• 67 phokis, and then up the valley of the Kephissos river 
through Phokis to join the Central Sector of the Corridor 
route ca. 1 km south of the modern village of Oiti (Kase GICR 
30) • 
The concern of Sparta was not to garrison Plataiai with 
hoplites, but to insure that Athens' loyal ally would not be 
able to off er assistance in any venture Athens might undertake 
in central Greece against Sparta.~ 
66 This is the only road into Boiotia that does not pass 
through Attica. It passes through Pegai and Aigosthenai in the 
Megarid and enters Boiotia near Kreusis about eight miles to 
the west of Plataiai. Hammond makes the unlikely suggestion 
that the route was used by the Spartans in 457 when they 
marched into Central Greece to settle the Dorian-Phokian 
conflict (Hammond 1986:294). Kleombrotos may have used it 
when he withdrew from Boiotia (Xen. Hel. 5. 4. 20), and the 
Spartans after their defeat at Leuktra in 371 (Xen. Hel. 
6.4.26). A hostile army entering Boiotia from this road and 
approaching Thebes would encounter the Plataians head on; an 
army headed northwesterly into western Boiotia, or to the 
Kephissos valley beyond, would be exposed to a flank attack at 
Thisbe or Leuktra. 
67 Strabo gives a full description of the position of 
Parapotamioi (Strabo 9.3.16). The site has been located at 
modern Belesi on a mound dominating the pass through which the 
Kephissos river flows from the main basin at Elateia in Phokis 
to the first plain of Boiotia at Khaironeia, a distance ca. 7 
km to the south (Fossey 1986:69-71). 
~ Before commencing hostilities King Archidamos proposed 
that the Plataians avoid any assault on their city by 
maintaining their neutrality both to Athens and to Sparta 
(2. 72 .1). Archidamos even suggested the Spartans would hold in 
trust for the Plataians, until the war was over, all their 
lands, buildings, and fruit trees ( 2. 72. 3) • There is no 
evidence that Sparta was not sincere in this overture (contra 
Kagan 1974:104). Plataiai was finally sacked in 427, the city 
razed, and the land incorporated into the territory of Thebes, 
34 
The corridor's North sector 
Herakleia was planned to be built in the environs of the 
North Sector of the Corridor route, which extended from the 
modern village of Oiti (Gardhikaki) and the east-wese ridge 
forming the south watershed of the Asopos Basin on the south, 
to the modern village of Kostalexi in the Malian plain on the 
north, a distance of ca. 15 km (Kase GICR 27-31). From the 
village of Oiti the road system provided an easy and gradual 
descent across the potentially hostile Oitaian territory, 
skirting the formidable citadel of Kastro Orias, 69 to arrive, 
at a distance of six km, at the Dhema Gap. 70 The pass at 
Dhema, controlled at various times by different ethne, was the 
only feasible passage between the Isthmus Corridor road system 
and the Malian Gulf. From the Malian Gulf two roads approached 
a Spartan ally (3.68). 
69 Kastro Orias is comparable in extent and defensibility 
to Acrocorinth (Wallace GICR 49). A suggested identification 
of the site is ancient Homilai (Philippson 1950:335-36). The 
site most likely was an Oitaian stronghold (Szemler GICR 81, 
83-86). 
ro The Dhema Gap or Pass, located ca. 300 m south of Kato 
Ohio Vouna, is about 500 m long by 50 m wide (the actual 
stenon measured at 18.20, + 0.50 m Kase GICR 25) and formed 
by the westernmost end of the Trachinian cliffs and the 
easternmost end of Mt. Oite (Mt. Tsouka). The mountain stream 
of the Xirias river bisects the pass and its valley furnishes 
a route for access (Cherf GICR 56; 1983:5, 23-30). PDE has 
established that the Dhema pass was "the pass through Trachis" 
of Herodotos (Hdt. 7.176.2; Kase GICR 23-25; Kase & szemler 
1982:356-62). 
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ohema, merging into one road just south of Kato Ohio Vouna 
before entering the pass. 71 
Less than 0.3 km south of the Dhema pass, a secondary 
road branched off the main Corridor roadway and ascended ESE 
to the upland Pergara plain located south of the Trachinian 
cliffs and connected with the north escarpment of these 
cliffs, only 5 km away. It was upon these cliffs that 
Herakleia would be founded. The topographic details of the 
"Herakleia roadway" will be discussed below. The connection of 
this roadway to the Isthmus Corridor route insured Herakleia 
its enormous strategic and tactical importance. 
stabilization of the North sector 
As a first step in implementing the new strategic plans, 
Sparta had to stabilize the recalcitrant belligerents of the 
North Sector. By the fifth century distinct tribal units with 
definable territories and boundaries occupied this sector, 
contesting for control of Dhema and its environs (Szemler GICR 
83). The friction among these tribes along the frontier zones 
for control of the fertile upland plains and the strategically 
important Dhema pass made the North Sector unstable and 
71 One road, approaching from the modern village of 
Vardhates, 2.5 km to the east, crossed the plain of Vardhates, 
continued westward through the narrow gorge of the Xirias 
river, piercing a ridge, ca. 80 m high, to the west of and 
above the modern town of Kato Ohio Vouna. A second road, 
approaching from Franzi, crossed the Gorgopotamos river and, 
continuing for 4 km, ascended the foothills of Oite to the 
village of Kato Ohio Vouna. 
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incompatible with a secure and reliable all-purpose road 
system. Before Sparta could establish its colony at Herakleia 
these tribes had to be pacified and brought under Spartan 
control. Among these tribes were the Dorians, Oitaians, 
Malians and Ainianes.n 
Oitaians 
The Oitaians, a loose association of mountain people, 
occupied a land-locked territory centered around their central 
cult place on Pyra, near the fountainhead of the Gorgopotamos 
river and the watersheds between the Mornos and the Asopos and 
the Mornos and the Kephissos rivers. Their domain, enclosed by 
the Tsouka massif in the north and the Xerovouni and 
Katavothra on the west,~ was hemmed in by the Dorians on the 
southeast, the Phokians on the northeast, and the Malians and 
Ainianes on the north and northwest. 
On the east and southeast, a wide erosion area, which 
included the upper Kephissos valley and the Central Sector of 
the Corridor, constituted a triple border where the Dorian, 
Malian and Oitaian frontier zones, as well as those of the 
n For an exhaustive discussion of the tribes in the North 
Sector and their territories (Philipson 1950:334 ff.; Szemler 
GICR 74-89). 
~ The northwestern frontier ran from Ano Ohio Vouna, 
situated south of and above the Dhema gap, thence southeast 
across the Pergara plain where it turned SSE along the Skatias 
gorge, including within its domain Kouvela and Kastro Orias 
(Wallace 1980:18/19). Crossing the Asopos river and following 
its western branch (Karnaria), the frontier zone probably 
extended SSW between Kalivia Eleftherochoriou and the modern 
village of oiti (Gardhikaki) (Szemler GICR 99), 
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oorian; Malian and Phokian, met, the podeon steinos of 
aerodotos {Szemler GICR 83, 99). These border zones must have 
brought the Oitaians into continuous conflict with their 
neighbors. Significantly, before the fifth century the 
oitaians controlled a greater part of the Corridor's routes 
from above the Dhema Gap to its descent to the upper Kephissos 
valley (Szemler GICR 84). 
Malians 
The Malians~ occupied the south and western rim of the 
Malian Gulf from Antikyra in the west as far as Alpenos of the 
Lokrians in the east {Gemme 1956b:395; Szemler GICR 78). The 
watershed of the Tsoukes and Portes mountains to the south of 
the Gulf probably represented the south frontier of their 
territory. 75 Their frontiers bordered on the Oitaians to the 
southwest, the Dorians to the southeast and the Ainianes to 
the northwest. The Trachinians, a division of the Malians, 
occupied the Trachinian cliffs, upon which Herakleia was 
founded, and the alluvial fans of the Melas (modern Xirias) 
74 According to Thukydides the Malians consisted of three 
divisions: the Paralians, Hieraians and Trachinians (3.92.2). 
The Paralians and Hieraians, judging from their name, must 
have been located along the Malian Gulf and at the religious 
site of Anthele, respectively. The Trachinians probably 
occupied the upper reaches of the Trachinian cliffs {Macan 
1908:1.297: Gemme 1956b 394; Hornblower 1991:503). 
75 From Elafopedema the south frontier of the Malians 
probably ran NNW, skirting Kastro Orias, and Kouvela, and 
descended north across the Pergara plain to the Xirias gorge. 
Thence to the Dhema Gap and Kato Dhio Vouna (Szemler GICR 81). 
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and the Asopos rivers below (Bequignon 1937:346-48; Szemler 
GICR 77/78) • 
Ainianes 
The Ainianes were located within the open and relatively 
defenseless middle and upper Spercheios valley west of Stavros 
(Beki) (Szemler GICR 82), and connected only peripherally with 
the Corr id or. 76 Their expansion to the south would place 
them into the North Sector of the Corridor in conflict with 
the Malians. The road leading to the Dhema pass from the north 
went through the territory of the Ainianes and fits Pausanias' 
description of the road taken by the Persians in 480 and the 
Celts in 279. 77 
We do not know who actually controlled the Dhema pass at 
the beginning of the Archidamian War. It appears from 
Herodotos that the Malians controlled the pass at the time of 
the Persian invasions (Hdt 7.201; Szemler GICR 82). If the 
Malians still controlled Dhema and its environs fifty years 
later, when Sparta undertook to found its colony, then, the 
~ Herodotos describes Antikyra as the first Malian city 
one encounters from the country of the Ainianes (Hdt. 
7.198.1). The Ainianes, along with the Dolopians, Thessalians 
and others, had submitted to Xerxes before his arrival at 
Thermopylai (Hdt. 7.132). Their frontier would extend SSE from 
Antikyra along the foothills of Mt. Oite toward Franzi and 
then south to the Gorgopotamos river, Ohio Vouna and the Dhema 
pass. Thence, it turned west over Tsouka and Xerovouni. 
77 Pausanias informs us that the road Hydarnes took, and 
later followed by the Celts, was not the steep way over Mt. 
Cite, but the easier way, more passable for an army, through 
the land of the Ainianes (Paus. 10.22.8). Cf. Szemler GICR 83. 
39 
Spartans, as the saviors of the Malians, could easily have 
substituted their own authority in the area. If the pass in 
426 was controlled by the Oitaians, Sparta's subduing the 
oitains would have placed the pass in Sparta's hands. 
Delphi's Role 
Before taking action the Spartans, true to tradition, 
consulted Delphi. 78 The oracle gave approval and colonists 
were sent out (3.92.5). Invitations to join the enterprise 
were extended throughout Hellas (3.92.5). Diodoros Sikoulos 
informs us of a population of 10,000: 4,000 Spartans and other 
Peloponnesians and 6,000 other Greeks (12.59). Although the 
numbers are questionable79 even if scaled down, the 
foundation of the colony would be a major enterprise, 
demanding time and careful coordination of logistics. 
Oikists 
The stipulations and terms under which a colony was 
founded by a mother city were customarily memorialized by 
n Consultation of the oracle was obligatory before the 
foundation of a colony (Hdt. 5. 42. 2; Parke and .Wormell I 
1956:49; A. Misiou, Thoukididou Seigraphei 1958:414). The 
procedures were very technical and ritualistic. Responses of 
the oracle were given only at dawn on the seventh day of each 
month, except the three winter months (Parke and Wormell I 
1956:30). 
79 These numbers have been criticized as impossibly large 
(Beloch Bevolkerung 1927:512). 
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inscription on a stele. 80 Unfortunately, no such stele or 
foundation decree is extant for Herakleia. Our only sources 
are Thukydides (3.92 ff.) and, four centuries later, Diodoros 
sikoulos (12.59.3-5). We are informed that the founders of the 
colony were three Lakedaimonians: Leon, Alkidas and Damagon 
(3.92.5-6) •81 
Leon was a well known historical figure. He had an 
illustrious political and social career in Sparta in the last 
half of the fifth century. 82 Alkidas had extensive naval 
experience; he is depicted by Thukydides as incompetent and 
8° For example, an inscribed bronze plaque c. 500-475 (?) 
by Hypoknemedian Lokrians for the establishment of a colony at 
Naupaktos (Meiggs & Lewis, no. 20=Tod 24). The foundation of 
Brea by Athens c. 445 is the subject of two fragments of a 
marble stele (Meiggs & Lewis, no. 49=Tod 44) • Cf. Graham 
1964:25 ff .. 
81 Cf. P. Poralla, Prosographie der Lakedaimonier, Studia 
Historica 1966:18, 41,83-84. 
82 In 440 his horses were victorious at Olympia (Eustath. 
ad Hom. Il. 2.852). In 421 he was recruited as an ambassador 
to Athens to settle disputes. Eponymous ephor for the year 
419/18. (Xen. Hell. 2.3.10). In 411 assisted the Chians in 
their naval battle against Athens (8.61.1-3). His son, 
Pedaritos appointed governor of Chics in 412/12 (8.28.5). His 
son, Antalkidas,was instrumental in the Peace with Persia in 
387 (Plut. Artax. 21.5). 
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. 83 savage. There is no further information about Damagon, 
except this one reference in Thukydides (Graham 1964:38). 
The Spartans chose with care. Leon would lend dignity and 
prestige to make Herakleia a great city (Died. 12.59) by 
welding the colonists into a new united population and thereby 
underscoring to the other Greeks the importance of the 
enterprise. Alkidas might have been appointed to take charge 
of the building of the docks at Herakleia or, as Gomme has 
suggested, his appointment might have been the reward of an 
easy post in the aristocratic manner in view of his avowed 
incompetency (Gomme 1956b:395 n. 4). A reasonable interval for 
the accomplishment of these tasks would be two or three years. 
Accordingly, the decision by Sparta to found Herakleia may 
safely be placed to the third year of the Archidamian War. 
i.e. 429/428. 
83 In 427 he was dispatched with 40 ships to render 
assistance to Mytelene in her revolt against Athens. By 
"loitering on the way" (3.27.1 tr. C.F. Smith) his mission 
failed. On his return voyage home he butchered most of his 
captives (3.32). When near Ephesus he sighted two Athenian 
triremes, he "sailed in haste and took to flight" (3.31.1). 
When he was dispatched to Korkyra to assist an oligarchic coup 
d'etat, he won a naval victory due more to the enemy's 
incompetence than to his own skills (Adcock CAH 5:221). He 
failed to follow up the naval victory the next day (despite 
the urging of his subordinate, Brasidas), and set sail for 
home upon learning that an Athenian fleet was approaching 
(3.81.1). 
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The New Colony and Its Relation to Trachis 
Thukydides locates the site of Herakleia in Malian 
Trachis, forty stadia84 from Thermopylai and twenty stadia 
from the sea (3.92.6). The territory of Trachis extended from 
the Spercheios river up to, but not including the kome of 
Anthele, 85 along the ridges of the mountains to the south, 
between the alluvial fans of the Melas (now the Xirias) and 
the Asopos rivers. 86 According to Herodotos, the Asopos 
gorge hemmed in the Trachinian territory on the south (Hdt. 
7.199). The location of Herakleia must be sought, therefore, 
within this sweep of land, ca. 2.5 km, running NW from the 
Asopos gorge along the Trachinian cliffs. 
Diodoros Sikoulos87 and Strabo88 furnish additional 
information to pinpoint the locus of Herakleia by describing 
the site in relation to ancient Trachis city, presumably the 
tribal center of Trachinia. The location of Trachis city, 
84 For the metric equivalent of a stade our study will use 
a mean measure of 172.14 meters. Cf. Jilthner RE 3A:1961-62; 
Szemler GICR 100 n. 34. 
85 If Thukydides (3.92.2) is correct, an issue we may 
securely assume, Anthele was controlled by the Hieraians. Cf. 
Gomme 1956b:394. 
86 Szemler GICR 77/78. See also footnote 73 above. 
87 Diodoros Sikoulos states that the Lakedaimonians 
colonized Trachis and renamed it Herakleia (Diod. 12.59.3), 
presumably assuming that the Spartan colony was founded on the 
same site. 
~ Strabo describes Herakleia as in earlier times having 
been called Trachin, and he locates the city at a distance of 
about six stades from the old Trachin (Strabo 9.4.13)~ 
43 
therefore, becomes the key for establishing the site of the 
city of Herakleia. 
The location of both Herakleia and Trachis city depends 
mainly on the identification of the Melas river, 89 which, 
according to Herodotos, was reached by the Persians five 
stades before their arrival at Trachis. He informs us that the 
Persians in 480 marched twenty stades from Antikyra on the 
spercheios river to reach the Dyras river (modern 
Gorgopotamos), and from the Dyras another twenty stades to the 
Melas river (modern Xirias). Five stades' distance beyond the 
Melas the Persians passed the city of Trachis, built at the 
widest point between the mountains and the sea (Hdt. 7.198-9). 
Some observers, agreeing that Trachis, located on the 
foothills of the cliffs adjacent to the actual route taken by 
Xerxes to Thermopylai, have failed to follow correctly 
Herodotos' directions. 90 Others have assumed that Trachis 
89 The generally accepted identification of the modern 
Xirias with the Melas of Herodotos is critical to this 
assessment (Grundy 1901:282; Hignett 1963:360; Szemler GICR 
80-81). A problem is that the Melas may be one of two streams 
now called Mavroneria. Stahlin (RE 5A:204) identified the 
Mavroneri, a tributary of Mavroneria, and flowing from 
Trachinian cliffs as the Melas. Bequignon (1937:64) identifies 
Stahlin' s Mavroneri with the Xirias, contra Pritchett who 
locates the Melas at springs only 0.90 km north of Herakleia 
and identifies the Xirias, rather than the Gorgopotamos, as 
the most likely candidate for Herodotos' Dyras (Pritchett 
1985:201-202 n. 15). Harmening (in Kromayer-Veith i903-30:24-
25) and Gomme (1956b:396) followed Herodotos' measurements 
from the Xirias in fixing the site of Trachis. 
90 Bequignon (1937:243-244) placed Malian Trachis in the 
plain south of Moustafa Bey at modern Hiraklion Trachinion, 
north of the Asopos' exit from the gorge (near Aghia 
Paraskevi). He concluded that Mycenaean Trachis was located on 
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city was removed from Xerxes' route. 91 Only a few have 
followed the directions of Herodotos precisely in locating 
Trachis five stades beyond the Melas river. 92 
The topographical and archaeological evidence, supported 
by the literary sources, suggests that a distinct promontory, 
the hilly ground above, and when the Malians later entered 
the area of the Malian gulf, Mycenaean Trachis became the 
acropolis of Malian Trachis (Bequignon 1937:257; Gomme 
1956b:396). 
Pritchett has located Trachis at the base of Bequignon's 
Skliphomeli ravine, 0.90 km south of a mountain spring which 
Pritchett incorrectly identified as the source of the Melas 
and from which he concluded Herodotos took his measurements 
(Pritchett 1985:201-204). 
Leake concluded that the Trachis of Herodotos occupied 
the low ground between the Mavroneria (Xirias) and the 
Karvunaria rivers (Asopos) (Leake II, 1967:29). Munro 
concluded that the Trachis of Herodotos occupied the low 
ground and that only after Herakleia, originally founded on 
the same site, moved up the hill in later centuries, did the 
lower town, six stades below, become exclusively known as 
Trachis (Munro JHS 22 1902:313). 
Stahlin placed Trachis six stades out on the alluvial fan 
below the Trachinian cliffs, in the area of modern Hiraklion 
Trachinion (Stahlin H.T 208 and RE 6A:1863 ff.). Pausanias 
refers to the ruins of Trachis at the end of a path past 
Herakleia (10.22.1), suggesting to one observer that in 426 
Trachis was abandoned and became the acropolis of Herakleia 
(Levi, 1971:263 n. 631). Cf. Szemler GICR 76-77. 
91 Grundy (1901:264-,283) concluded not only that 
Herakleia was at a different site than Trachis, but he 
suggested Trachis was in the Kastro-Orias-Kouvela area, as the 
crow flies, five km south of Vardhates. The site has never 
been securely identified (Harmening A.S. 25 n. 2). Kolias, 
EEBS 10:80-81 (1933); Lolling 1989:135; see Bequignon 
1937:254). 
92 Harmening in Kromayer-Veith 1903-30: 24-25. See Szemler 
GICR 80. 
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named Rakhi ta, 93 about 18 m above the Malian plain and ca. 
1.5 km WNW of the Asopos gorge is the most likely site of the 
Malian Trachis of 480 B.C., as well as of the Homeric Trachis 
of Achilles~ (Szemler GICR 80). The distance from Rakhita to 
vardhates, the outlet for the Xirias river (Herodotos' Melas) 
is ca. 850 m. This measurement accords with Herodotos' 
statement that Trachis was five stades (860.7 m) beyond the 
Melas river. Late Mycenaean pottery found at this location and 
a cist grave (L.H. III A-B) in nearby Vardhates confirm the 
early occupation of the area (Simpson and Lazenby 1959:103-
104; Wallace GICR 48). From its proximity to Vardhates Trachis 
would control access to the Corridor (Szemler GICR 81) . 95 
93 A toponym with a probable Slavic origin (Rosser GICR 
146). 
~ The Catalogue of Ships included the men of Trachis as 
part of the contingent under Achilles' command (Il. 2.681.5). 
That the kingdom of Peleus was centered in the Spercheios 
valley is established (Simpson and Lazenby 1959:102). Some 
scholars have raised doubts whether there ever was a Homeric 
Trachis. Others question whether Herodotos' city was a 
continuation of the Homeric city, and, despite the explicit 
distances given by Strabo, locate the Trachis of Herodotos 
within Spartan Herakleia For a detailed discussion cf. Szemler 
GICR 78. 
95 Since the sea extended to the base of Kallidromos in 
the Mycenaean period, there was no passage at Thermopylai at 
that time (Kraft GICR Chap. I). Trachis controlled the only 
access to Central Greece. The coast line in that period was 
not as far west and along the Trachinian cliffs as in ca. 4500 
B.P. (Kraft GICR Fig 1-1 to 1-10), but it had to be further 
west than appears in contemporary maps. It was probably north 
and west of Moschohori in the south and just north of Frantzi 
in the west (Szemler GICR 78), so Trachis at that time was 
probably on the water. 
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The site Rahkita cannot, however, be the site of Spartan 
Herakleia. Although there is easy access from Rakhita to the 
corridor through Vardhates (Paus. 10.22.8; Szemler GICR 132 n. 
56), the Trachinian cliffs, which rise dramatically and 
precipitously to the south of the site, 96 obstruct all views 
to the south. With no vista to the south, Rakhita would have 
difficulty monitoring activity in the North Sector of the 
corridor, and particularly, the Oitaians, whom the colony was 
ostensibly founded to subdue. Furthermore, the distance from 
Rakhita to Thermopylai is ca. 46.4 stades (8 km), 
significantly greater than the 40 stades ( 6. 9 km) which 
Thukydides gives for the distance from Herakleia to 
Thermopylai (3.92.6). 
Bequignon97 , Munro98 , Leake99 , w. Kendrick 
Pritchett100 , and other observers, have correctly placed 
Herakleia between the Asopos and the Xirias rivers, but they 
96 The railroad, constructed in 1890 and passing above 
Rakhita, was required to blast tunnels blasted in the cliffs, 
since there was no room for switchbacks. 
97 Bequignon concluded the later citadel of Herakleia was 
on the site of Mycenaean Trachis (Bequignon 1937:257). 
98 According to Munro, Herakleia was founded on the site 
of ancient Trachis, but when Herakleia moved up the hill in 
later centuries, the lower town, six stades below, became 
exclusively known as Trachis (JHS 22 (1902). 
99 Leake concluded that Herakleia at the Roman siege in 
the second century occupied the low ground between the 
Mavroneria (Xirias) and Karvunaria (Asopos) at the same site 
as the Trachis of Herodotos (II 1967:29). 
100 Pritchett {1985:203) located Trachis on the same site 
as later Herakleia. 
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have erroneously assumed that Herakleia was established on 
the site of Trachis city. Contributing to this erroneous 
conclusion may have been Diodoros Sikoulos' statement 
(12.59.3) that the Lakedaimonians colonized Trachis and 
renamed it Herakleia; and Thukydides' statement (3.92.6) that 
the Spartans built new walls around Herakleia. 101 It is 
uncertain whether Trachis city was still inhabited when 
Herakleia was founded. 102 We may, nevertheless, assume that 
the Spartans strengthened its fortifications, only 1 km away, 
or alternately, subsumed the city within the defensive 
perimeters of the new colony. 
Site of Herakleia 
The site of Spartan Herakleia is to be sought on the 
escarpment of the Trachinian cliffs above the left bank of the 
Asopos river as it emerges from the gorge, at an elevation ca. 
60 to 200 m (Wallace GICR 48; Szemler GICR 118). The site is 
ca. 7 km from the hot springs at Thermopylai. If Thukydides, 
in measuring the distance from Thermopylai to Herakleia used 
101 To Gomme (1956b: 395 n. 6) the evidence suggests 
Herakleia was founded on a new site, contra Pritchett 
1985:201. This issue will be discussed below, p. 59 ff .• 
102 Al though Tr a chis existed when Herodotos visited the 
area, Diodoros Sikoulos states Trachis was deserted when 
Herakleia was founded (Diod. 12.59.4) The date of Herodotos' 
visit to the area is uncertain. The final edition of his last 
three books has been dated to the first years of the 
Peloponnesian War (How & Wells 1928:1.9 par. 9 and n. 1), in 
which event his visit to the area would have been before 
Herakleia was founded. 
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the hot springs at Thermopylai as the base, as did Herodotos 
(Hdt. 7.176.2), the distance of forty stades (6.9 km) which 
Thukydides gives from Thermopylai to Herakleia fits precisely. 
The placement by Thukydides of the colony twenty stades from 
the sea also conforms to the assumed coast line in the fifth 
century, ca. 3.5 km from the Trachinian cliffs, as suggested 
by geological evidence. 103 This site is, furthermore, ca. 
1.0 km SE of Rakhita. The measurement conforms to Strabo's 
statement placing Herakleia six stades (ca. 1032 m) from 
Trachis (9.4.13). 
The Herakleia described by Bequignon, for example, 
extended ca. 0.50 km along the Trachinian cliffs from the 
Skliphomeli gorge on the west to the Asopos gorge on the east 
(Bequignon 1937:245-246). Many monuments which Bequignon 
described are no longer extant. 104 Toward the northwest 
along the present road to Ano Vardhates there are only a few 
scattered sections and single blocks from the circuit wall 
which Bequignon described. East of the old Lamia road near the 
103 Kraft GICR 8/9 and Fig. 8-2. By the fifth century the 
coast line was further east than in the Late Helladic period 
and probably followed a line between the villages of 
Moschohorion and Koroma (Szemler GICR 118), a distance of ca. 
3.5 km. 
104 The eastern wall system of the lower city was 
completely destroyed by modern activity, especially bulldozing 
(Wallace GICR 48). Bequignon had reported a 16 meter section 
of wall, 3 meters high, near Aghia Paraskevi church east of 
old Lamia road. This wall section no longer exists. The church 
ruins in the immediate area are not Aghia Paraskevi but 
reportedly the church of Zodohospigi, washed away by the 
flooding of the Asopos. The rubble remains of Aghia Paraskevi 
are about 30 or 40 meters to the south and east. 
49 
gorge ·there are only a few stone remnants of the site 
identified by Bequignon as the gymnasium. 105 
Sherds from the Classical period have been found in the 
plain forty meters below the Trachinian cliffs along with 
sherds from the Hellenistic and Roman periods, as well as 
remnants of the circuit wall of the city (Wallace GICR 48). 
some investigators identified these remains as the site of the 
spartan colony, although the archaeological evidence in the 
plain suggests the Herakleia of the Aitolian and Roman 
periods, described by Pausanias106 and Livy. 101 
The Classical sherds in the plain appear to be washout 
from the Spartan colony founded at the higher elevation on the 
escarpment of the Trachinian cliffs. The Hellenistic and Roman 
sherds, and probably the remnants of the circuit wall, appear 
to be of a later period when the population of Herakleia 
expanded into the Malian plain from the colony's original 
perch. 
1~ Cut stones with dimensions as large as 0.65 m x 0.50 
m are in situ. Parallel walls, ca. 10 m apart, each 2 blocks 
high and ca. 3 m long, butt into the living rock of the 
mountain. Bequignon's map, however, shows the gymnasium is 
free standing and in a declivity in the mountain and not 
abutting it. The gymnasium played a tactical role in the 
siege of Herakleia in 191 (Livy 36.22.7). 
1~ 10.20.4-in reference to Brennos' failure to take the 
city in 279, although he plundered the surrounding fields and 
slaughtered the people working there. 
1~ 36.16.5-in reference to the battle at Herakleia in 
191. Livy probably never visited the area and wrote nearly two 
centuries after the campaign of Acilius Glabrio, cos. 191. 
Thus, accepting his topography for fifth century Herakleia is 
questionable. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF HERAKLEIA 
Herakleia's Connection with Dhema 
and the Corridor Route system 
The strategic importance of the colony lay in its 
proximity to, and tactical connection with, the Dhema pass. 
Based on autopsy, sight lines from the Trachinian cliffs are 
unimpeded to the pinnacle of Aetos 1~ and to the citadel of 
Kastro Orias 1~ on the south and to the Malian Gulf on the 
north and west. To the east, the view is unobstructed to the 
Damasta spur of Mt. Kallidromos, approaching the west gate of 
Thermopylai. These superb lookout points lend themselves to 
1 ~ The hill, Aetos, ca. 6 km SW of Herakleia, was within 
the core area of the oitaians (Szemler GICR 83), whose 
belligerence was instrumental in the foundation of the colony. 
On the top, at a height of 950 m, there are remnants of a 
fortification. on its eastern slopes sherds were excavated and 
dated from the Early Neolithic to the Late Helladic periods. 
Classical, Hellenistic, Roman and Byzantine sherds, 
contemporary with Herakleia, were also found. 
From Aetos there are clear and unobstructed views of the 
pass at Dhema; and of the Malian Gulf to the north (from 
Frantzi on the west to the west gate of Thermopylai on the 
east) . Toward the south, the site dominates the upper 
Kephissos valley and the Gravia pass (Kase GICR 30; Wallace 
GICR 50). 
1 ~ Kastro Orias, ca. 4 km WSW of Herakleia at an 
elevation of 743 m, was also in the territory of the Oitaians 
(Szemler GICR 85). It offers excellent views of the Malian 
Gulf and Gravia (Wallace GICR 50) • 
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polybios' description of fire and smoke signalling posts 
(Polyb. 10.43-47) from which the colony could be alerted 
immediately of approaching danger from all directions. 
Herakleia would supply the permanent garrison for Dhema pass, 
only 5 km away, and control mass movements in and out of 
central Greece. 
Such a control was made possible by an elaborate road 
system, (designated by PDE as the "Herakleia roadway" Kase 
GICR 25), which connected Herakleia with Dhema and the 
Corridor's road system. This roadway is also the shortest 
distance from the upland plains of Pergara and Zirelia between 
Herakleia and Dhema to the Malian Gulf below. 110 The 5 km 
long road is not a path, but a well-built and well-engineered 
mountain roadway. It affords immediate and easy passage from 
Herakleia to the Great Isthmus Corridor. It could have been 
constructed by the Spartans for direct access to Dhema and the 
Corridor, when they founded Herakleia (Kase GICR 27). 
The road ascends from the escarpments of the Trachinian 
cliffs by means of wide-angle, banked turns and switchbacks. 
In its course the roadbed alternates from packed colluvium to 
rock. The rock cut section of the roadway is ca. 2.20-3.0 m 
wide, and it uses retaining walls of placed stone on the 
downside and terracing on the upside. The first kilometer of 
this roadway from Herakleia negotiates a steep section of the 
110 Based on notes dictated to the writer by E.W. Kase at 
autopsy of the region in 1987. For a detailed description of 
the Herakleia road see Kase GICR 25-27. 
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Trachinian cliffs. It begins ca. 180 m southeast of a line of 
ashlar blocks identified as the ancient city wall and at an 
elevation of 60 m. As previously noted, it proceeds by wide-
angled banks, turns and switchbacks. The road makes a steep 
ascent to an elevation of 320 m where it turns around a large 
semi-circular platform identified as the phrourion of 
Herakleia. 111 
At an elevation of 435 m the rock cut roadway becomes a 
narrow causeway separating two ravines: to the north of the 
causeway, one of the ravines, the Skliphomeli, declines 
northerly to form a cleft in the face of the Trachinian cliffs 
and the westernmost limit of Herakleia; to the south, the 
Siderhoporto ravine declines southward to join the Asopos 
gorge. The walled citadel of Herakleia was situated in a 
highly defensible position between these ravines. The 
identification of this site as the citadel of Herakleia 
described by Livy in the Roman siege appears certain. 112 The 
111 A large rock-hewn semi-circular structure with a 
diameter of 14.5 m N-S and 12.5 m E-W the perimeter of which 
is outlined with small cut stones. The site furnishes a 180 
degree view of the Malian plain. Wallace, probably referring 
to the Malian plain rather than sea level, placed it at an 
elevation of 280 m (Wallace GICR 48). This site was not 
reported by Bequignon. The foundation of worked stone at a 
lower elevation and ca. 150 m to the southeast, identified by 
Bequignon as the phrourion, may have been the meeting place of 
the Aitolian League (Kase GICR 26). 
112 Livy's description of the siege of the citadel of 
Herakleia unequivocally establishes this site as the citadel. 
Acilius Glabrio deployed troops to a cliff about equal in 
height to the citadel, but cut off from the citadel by a 
valley so narrow that weapons could be hurled into it (Livy 
36.24.8-9). 
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roadway continued around the south side of the citadel. A 
short distance west of the citadel the two ravines converge 
until they are separated only by a narrow causeway on which 
the road continues. 
Beyond the causeway the roadway divides into a north 
branch and a south branch. The north branch ascends west by 
northwest, before rounding at an elevation of 520 m the peak 
of Mt. Panayia. It continues for ca. 2 km around the north end 
of Delphinon before rejoining the south branch of the road. 
The south branch ascends to an elevation of 575 m within a 
distance of 650 m southwest of the citadel. Here, on an 
eastward projecting flat-topped promontory overlooking the 
lower end of the Asopos gorge, a site locally identified as 
Siderhoporto is located. 113 
After the north and south branches rejoin west of 
Delphinon, the roadway continues an easy passage for about 2 
km through the well-watered and fertile plains of Pergara and 
Zirelia, which could have supplied food and water for 
113 The ceramic evidence at Siderhoporto is contemporary 
with Herakleia, and various conjectures concerning its 
identity have been made. The site may have been the city of 
Parasopioi, referred to by Strabo (9.2.23,9.5.10). Possibly, 
the site may have been part of the defensive perimeter of 
Herakleia (Kase CGICR 44 n. 18). Among modern investigators 
Munro identified Siderhoporto as the citadel of Trachis, 
concluding it must have been occupied in 480 by the Greeks to 
bar passage through the gorge. Hignett believed Siderhoporto 
was the citadel of Herakleia (1963:357). stahlin shared this 
view (Plate XII 1, facing page 224). Grundy identified 
Siderhoporto as the site of Herakleia in the post-Spartan 
period, concluding it would command passage through the Asopos 
gorge (1901:264). 
54 
personnel of the Herakleia-Dhema-Thermopylai complex. The 
Herakleia road then joined the Great Isthmus Corridor route 
ca. 2. 5 km north of Kastro Orias (Kase GICR 26). Another 
branch of the road joined the Isthmus Corridor route ca. 300 
m south of Dhema. 
Herakleia's connection with Thermopylai 
In light of the intimate geographic and strategic 
connection of Herakleia and its well engineered roadway with 
the Dhema pass and the Isthmus Corridor route, the connection 
between Herakleia and the pass at Thermopylai must be 
reassessed as well. 
The geological investigation of PDE has revealed 
startling evidence proving that until the end of the sixth 
century the "gates" at Thermopylai were virtually closed by 
the encroachment of the marine waters of the Malian Gulf upon 
the alluvial fans of the rivers that drained Mts. Oiti and 
Kallidromos (Kraft GICR 8). Thermopylai was not suitable for 
the mass movement of men and goods before ca. 200 (Kraft GICR 
6-8) and, therefore, unavailable through the greater part of 
pre-Roman history as a major access route to southern Greece 
(Kraft et al. JFA 1987:194; Szemler GICR 110). Thus, when 
Herakleia was founded, Thermopylai was not yet passable for 
major military and commercial traffic (Szemler GICT 112), and 
would not have influenced the Spartans in their selection of 
a site for their colony. 
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Contrary to the communis opinio, 114 some scholars 
concluded that Herakleia was not intended to, nor did it ever, 
control the pass at Thermopylai, situated ca. 7 km to the 
southeast (Cary CQ 1922:98/99; Bequignon 1937:254; Andrewes 
1978:96 ff.; Hornblower 1991:505). But, without knowledge of 
the Great Isthmus Corridor route and the pass at Dhema, they 
assumed that the Asopos river bed, immediately to the east, in 
a gorge ca. 60-200 m below the Trachinian cliffs was the 
entrance to Central Greece, 115 and asserted that Herakleia 
was to secure that entrance and not Thermopylai. Bequignon 
succinctly expresses this opinion: "Pourtant si Heracleia 
permit a Sparte de surveiller tout le golfe Maliaque, elle ne 
commande pas les Thermopyles, mais elle se borne a barrer 
l'acces en Beotie par l'Asopos" (1937:254). 
The misleading assumption that Thermopylai provided the 
primary access to Central Greece has been reinforced by the 
interpretation given to a sentence of Thukydides: 
, , 
'IJE(J)pla TE 
'Y ' • I! ' ' Q , 7rapEUICEUU~OVTO /Ca£. etp<;aU TO teara eyt:pµo7rv"Aar:; 
t t\ \ I tr t I 
ICaT aVTO TO <TTEVOV, 07TCIJr:; EVcpVAalCTa auro£r:; 
Ei1]. (3.92.6) 
Most commentators who interpret this passage argue that 
the Spartans, as a defensive measure, fenced off the approach 
114 That the importance of Herakleia was its connection 
with Thermopylai: Grundy 1901:268; Stahlin RE 8.68-425.9; Bury 
1975:366; Pritchett 1985:191 ff .. Cf. Chapter III above. 
115 Autopsy, however, has shown that passage through the 
Asopos gorge for any movement, other than occasional mules, is 
impossible and, in any event, seasonal (Szemler GICR 61-62). 
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from Thermopylai by presumably placing a wall across the pass 
itself. Although textual analysis is beyonc:I_the skill of this 
writer, the acceptance of a reading of " €.. ~? ~ n, '1 " 
:>, t:' 
(a reading found only in MS E), rather than "'"Y\p':>Cl.."1 \(:) " 
(in all other manuscripts), 116 followed by Gerome's 
characterization of the latter reading as "clearly impossible" 
(1956b:397), is questionable. The author concedes that the 
former reading fits syntactically; but the latter reading, 
found in all other manuscripts, notwithstanding the 
syntactical difficulties, corresponds more closely to the 
topographical features of the area. The latter, and possibly 
more appropriate, reading, i.e. that the Spartans made 
preparations and began to put up boat slips along the shore 
toward Thermopylai in the direction of the pass its elf, 
eliminates any suggestion of a wall across the narrows toward 
Thermopylai. 
According to the geological evidence of PDE, it is 
inconceivable that neoria, i.e. docks for triremes, or other 
naval vessels with offensive capabilities, would have been 
built in the fifth century in the shallow waters of the 
western Malian Gulf adjacent to the coastal road toward 
Thermopylai. 117 These waters may have been deep enough for an 
116 Thuk. ad l·.9.·, H. s. Jones and J. E. Powell, eds.; MS 
E=llth century Heidelberg 252 (Palatinus), in Hall 1913:ad 
Thuk. 
117 Geological core borings suggests that in the fifth 
century the waters adjacent to the west and middle gates at 
Thermopylai had a depth of only 1-2 meters (Kraft GICR 8). 
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Athenian "rowing boat 11118 to remain near the shore and 
maintain contact with the Greek army at Thermopylai during the 
persian War, or for boat slips for flat bottomed, or slightly 
v-shaped, boats, not unlike modern sharpies, but probably 
inadequate for anchoring triremes or other ships with 
offensive capabilities. 119 
Thus, according to the reading in the majority of the 
manuscripts and the topographical evidence, it is improbable 
that a wall was built by the Spartans across the pass at 
Thermopylai; and, if a wall was built by the Spartans, as 
these commentators conclude, we are neither informed of its 
purpose, nor can we identify an enemy which this wall was 
intended to block. 
It is known there was a wall at Thermopylai, but its 
location is questionable. Spyridon Marinates found remains of 
a wall at the Kolonos hill which he identified as the Phokian 
wall described by Herodotos (Hdt. 7.176.3-5; Marinates 1939-
40:333 ff.). But, it was shown that this wall, facing 
southeast, was probably erected in the sixth century by the 
118 Hdt. 8.21. tr. A. D. Godley. 
119 The trireme had an estimated draft of 3 feet and with 
its complement of 170 to 200 men, a displacement of ca. 69 
tons (Rodgers 1964:45-48; Casson 1991:85}. Such a vessel would 
appear to require deeper waters than the shore at Herakleia 
Trachinia provided in the fifth century. 
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Malians as a defensive wall against Phokian raiders 
( szemler, GICR 107) . 120 
Ultimately, Gomme's suggestion must be rejected. There is 
no evidence that the Spartans built a wall, either to secure 
control of Thermopylai as an easy passage to and from Central 
Greece, or to remove threats from the north to Sparta's 
Lokrian, Phokian and Boiotian allies (Gomme 1956b:397). If the 
Spartans built a wall at all, it was probably intended to 
def end against forays from the south-east along the coastal 
road, possibly by the Athenians or their allies. 
The erection of a wall at Thermopylai had little 
strategic significance for the colony whose purpose -as was 
argued above- was the control of activity in the Corridor's 
road system. 
When Herakleia was founded, Thermopylai was an available, 
but less direct and desirable, route for entry into Central 
Greece. Thermopylai had not yet become an essential component 
of the Dhema-Herakleia defensive complex which, in later 
centuries, became the main line of resistance against 
invaders. But even in the later centuries, Thermopylai was the 
weak link of the defensive line and invariably became the main 
target for invasions, when passage into the Corridor road 
120 The wall was mistakenly identified by Herodotos as the 
wall initially built by the Phokians against the Thessalians 
and rebuilt by the Greeks in 480 against the Persians (Hdt. 
8.27-33). For an analysis of this mistaken identification cf. 
Szemler GICR 106 ff. 
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system through Dhema was foreclosed by the defenders of 
gerakleia. 
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CHAPTER VI 
HERAKLEIA TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS 
Athenian Initiatives in central Greece 
In the year of Herakleia's foundation, Athens conducted 
two major campaigns in Central Greece. These campaigns were 
responses by Athens prompted by the change in Sparta's 
strategy to dominate Central Greece, to acquire control of the 
Corridor, and to establish a base at Herakleia. 
In the first major campaign Nikias, with 60 ships and 
2,000 hoplites, joined forces at Tanagra with other Athenian 
troops under Hipponikos and Eurymedon. 121 Although the 
ancient sources recognize the troop movements of Nikias and 
those of Hipponikos and Eurymedon as coordinated for concerted 
action (3.91.5; Died 12.65.4), these sources fail to give a 
purpose for these campaigns. One commentator has found this 
failure "puzzling and unsatisfactory" (Kagan 1974:198). 
In a second major campaign in 426 Demosthenes, commanding 
a fleet of 30 Athenian ships, sailed around the Peloponnese 
121 Athens' new offensive strategy is shown by Nikias's 
426 campaign. After sailing to Melos and ravaging that island, 
he landed at Oropos and then marched to Tanagra. After 
Tanagra, he made a detour to pillage the Lokrian coast before 
returning to Athens (3.91.1-5). 
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and attacked Leukas. Right before a decisive victory at 
Leukas, however, Demosthenes abandoned this campaign and 
proceeded against the Aitolians. 1n According to Thukydides, 
Demosthenes made this decision "chiefly because he thought 
that, without help from Athens (emphasis supplied), he would 
be able with his allies from the mainland, once the Aitolians 
had joined him, to make an overland expedition against the 
Boiotians ••. 11 (3.95.1 tr. C.F. Smith). 
Thukydides is not clear about the proposed route of 
Demosthenes' campaign, other than that he intended to pass 
through Ozolian Lokris to Kytinion (3. 95 .1). 123 Demosthenes 
most probably planned to use the South Sector of the Corridor 
to get to Kytinion. 124 Kytinion, as part of the tetrapolis 
122 Thukydides informs us that Demosthenes was induced to 
undertake this new campaign not only because the Aitolians 
were hostile to Naupaktos, a strategic naval base of Athens, 
but also by the prospect that by defeating the Aitolians "he 
would find it easy to bring the mainland in that region into 
subjection to the Athenians (3.94.3 tr. C.F. Smith). 
123 Gomme suggested that the campaign followed the Mornos 
river valley (probably the modern Daphnous) and Demosthenes 
intended to cross the headwaters of the Mornos at the 
watershed of Mt. oite (Gemme 1956b:482). B.W. Henderson also 
accepts this view, indicating it is only a march of eight 
miles across the watershed to the north-south road in Doris 
(1927:55). This suggestion must be rejected. Although the trek 
across the watershed does reach, and is a short distance from, 
the north-south road in Doris (the Isthmus Corridor route) 
south of the Pindos river near modern Kastelli (Kase GICR 31), 
autopsy of PDE has determined it is impassable for any 
fighting force. 
124 Al though Amphissa, the dominant city in the South 
Sector, had been allied with Sparta since the beginning of the 
war (Died. 12.42.4), the rest of the West Lokrians were allies 
of Athens (Gomme 1956b:403-405). Demosthenes had used oineon 
in West Lokris both in his invasion of Aitolia (3.95.3) and in 
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of Doris, was most certainly one of the areas "liberated" by 
Sparta from Oitaian incursions, and we can assume that in 426 
it was under Spartan control. Its strategic importance to the 
corridor has been previously discussed. It is no surprise that 
Demosthenes intended to make Kytinion an objective of his 
campaign. In the hands of Athens Kytinion would disrupt 
Sparta's access to the Central Sector of the Corridor. 
Demosthenes intended to proceed from Kytinion through 
Phokis, with Kallidromos on his left and Parnassos on his 
right, and invade Boiotia. Thukydides does not give the 
purpose of this offensive. 125 He only tells us that the 
Phokians would be eager to join the Athenian expedition 
(3.95.1). 
Both Nikias and Eurymedon's campaigns in eastern Boiotia 
and Demosthenes' campaign in Aitolia are described by 
Thukydides as occurring in the sixth year of the war, i.e. 
426/425. He dates the campaign of Nikias as occurring in "that 
same summer" ( 3. 91. 1 tr c. F. Smith) ; and the campaign of 
Demosthenes "during the same summer" (3.94.1-3), but he fails 
to make any connection between the two. He dates the 
foundation of Herakleia "about this time" (3.92.1 tr. 
his retreat (3.98.3). 
125 Gornme' s opinion that the purpose of the campaign was 
to overthrow Boiotia (Gornme 1956b:402) does not appear 
probable. The periodic invasion of Attica by Boiotian cavalry 
(4.95.2;4.96.8) would not appear to justify such a campaign. 
Kagan recognizes the value of Demosthenes' campaign in 
disrupting Spartan passage to Herakleia (Kagan 1974:208). 
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c.F.Smith), but he makes no connection between the foundation 
of the colony and the two Athenian campaigns. Thukydides even 
suggests that Demosthenes' campaign was a spontaneous 
undertaking without the knowledge or approval of Athens 
p.95.1). 
The conclusion seems strong, however, that the two 
Athenian campaigns not only were related, but also were direct 
counter- measures to the change in Sparta's strategy for 
conducting the war. The Euryrnedon-Nikias campaigns, occurring 
in eastern Boiotia, were synchronized to detract the Boiotians 
from Athens' real objective, western Boiotia and Phokis (Kagan 
1974:208). The western campaign would have expanded Athenian 
influence in Phokis and threatened the newly planned colony 
at Herakleia. 
Spartan Reaction 
According to Thukydides, the Lakedaimonians, toward 
autumn1u 426, dispatched 3,000 hoplites to Central Greece in 
preparation for the capture of Naupaktos ( 3. 100. 2) . 127 The 
126 Gemme suggests Eurylochos' campaign was about the end 
of September or early October (Gemme 1956b:409). 
127 Naupaktos was Lokrian at the beginning of the fifth 
century (Meiggs & Lewis 1975: No 20; Szemler CGICR 91). 
Athenian influence began in 462 with the settlement under 
Athenian safe conduct, of Messenian helots, who had 
surrendered at Mt. Ithome (1.102-103). At the beginning of the 
war Naupaktos was allied with Athens (2.9.4; Died. 12.42.4). 
In two stunning battles near Naupaktos in 429 Phormio 
defeated the Peloponnesian fleet (2.83-92). Phormio's naval 
victories insured this naval fortress its stranglehold in the 
Corinthian Gulf (Adcock, CAH 5:211; Kagan 1974:115; Hammond 
1986:355; Bengtson 1988:139). 
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army convened at Delphi under the Spartan general, 
Eurylochos. The evidence suggests that the campaign, triggered 
by Demosthenes' campaign in Aitolia, was probably intended to 
safeguard for Sparta the route to Herakleia through the South 
sector of the Corridor. 
Sparta's control of the South Sector of the Corridor was 
indeed vulnerable from Naupaktos. Naupaktos, a major Athenian 
naval station, commanded all traffic in and out of the 
Corinthian Gulf, could curtail grain imports and trade 
exports, and could cause economic ruin for Sparta's allies 
along the coast of the Corinthian Gulf (Kagan 1976: 30; 
Bengtson 1988:139). Nevertheless, the stranglehold which this 
naval fortress had on the western Corinthian Gulf does not 
appear to have posed a threat to Sparta's interests to explain 
Eurylochos' campaign. For Athens to close off the grain supply 
to the Peloponnese by blockading the Gulf was impossible. 1u 
The chief threat which Naupaktos posed for Sparta was 
that Naupaktos might become a base for Athens to launch an 
attack upon the South Sector of the Corridor. Such an attack 
could have come through the Elates pass that provides a 
practical passage across the formidable Ghiona mountain range, 
separating Naupaktos from Amphissa, in West Lokris (3.101.2), 
The West Lokrians, with the exception of Amphissa which was 
topographically separate, were friendly to Athens ( 3. 95. 3; 
3.101.1; Gemme 1956b:ll; Hornblower 1991:248). Athens might, 
iu Kagan 1974:29; contra Miltner, RE 19:781. 
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at any time, with the support of Naupaktos and the West 
Lokrians, launch an offensive through the Elates pass against 
.Alllphissa. Eurylochos' campaign to capture Naupaktos appears to 
have been intended to remove permanently this threat. 
We are not informed when Sparta decided to send 
Eurylochos to Central Greece, 129 but the decision may have 
been made before Demosthenes aborted his campaign in Aitolia. 
Demosthenes' campaign, if successful, would have undermined 
Sparta's control of the Corridor and the Thracian offensive. 
Thus, Eurylochos' preparations appear to have been directed 
against Demosthenes. 130 
The troops which Eurylochos mustered at Delphi included 
500 hoplites from Herakleia, and these obviously had to be 
withdrawn through the Corridor from Herakleia to Delphi 
(3.100.2). Thus, we must assume that in August 426, a month or 
two before Eurylochos' campaign, the Spartans already 
controlled the entire Isthmus Corridor route. In the North and 
Central Sectors of the Corridor Sparta had consolidated its 
influence by eliminating the Oitaian forays against Doris and 
1 ~ In Thukydides (3.100.1) the Aitolians had urged Sparta 
to capture the stronghold, even before Demosthenes began his 
campaign. The Messenians at Naupaktos had previously invited 
Athens to intervene against Aitolia, which presumably 
explained Aitolian's hostility to Naupaktos (3.100.1). Gemme 
suggests that the invitation from Aitolia to Sparta to take 
action against Naupaktos was extended before the actual 
invasion of Aitolia by Demosthenes (Gemme 1956b:408). 
130 Demosthenes never reached the Corridor. On his way 
from Naupaktos he was defeated by the Aitolians and was forced 
to abandon his campaign (3.98.3-5; Szemler GICR 117). 
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Trachis, while in the South Sector, Amphissa controlled the 
multiple road system and was cooperative with Sparta. 131 The 
convergence of Eurylochos' army at Delphi suggests that even 
the sacred precinct, on the perimeter of the South Sector, was 
in the pro-Spartan camp. 132 
campaigns in 424 
Although the Spartans had established a base at 
Herakleia in 426, they were unable to use this base as a 
launching pad for an assault on Athens' allies in Thrace until 
the summer of 424 (4.78.1), because such a campaign required 
the cooperation of the king of Macedon and local oligarchs in 
Thessaly, through whose territories Spartan troops had to 
cross (Brunt JCAC 1965:274). The opportunity for Sparta came 
in 424 when Perdikkas, the king of Macedon, needed military 
assistance to subdue the revolt of his vassal, Arrhabaios, 
king of the Lynkestr ian Macedonians ( 4. 8 3 • 1) • 133 Perdikkas 
131 Thukydides informs us that Amphissa cooperated with 
Eurylochos chiefly because of fear of the Phokians (3.101.2). 
1~ As additional evidence of Delphi's pro-Spartan posture 
at this time: Delphi bid Sparta to found its colony at 
Herakleia (3.92.5); at the beginning of the war Delphi had 
predicted victory for the Lakedaimonians and promised 
assistance to them (1.118.3). 
133 Perdikkas, the king of Macedon, dedicated to the 
politics of expediency, had throughout his reign vacillated in 
his relations not only with Athens, but with all his 
neighbors. 
Prior to the founding of Amphipolis in 436 by Athens, 
Perdikkas had been her ally, but the new garrisons there 
alarmed him, no less than they alarmed the Potidaians, and he 
shifted his allegiance (Hammond 1986: 317) . Amphipolis 
furthermore had obstructed his aspirations of regaining the 
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for this purpose sought the help of Sparta, promising to share 
the cost of Spartan troops (4.80.1; 4.83.5-6). 
Perdikkas' invitation came at a critical moment for 
Sparta. Athens had recently assumed an aggressive posture, 
attributable perhaps to a new war faction at the helm 
(Bengtson 1988:141). In 424 Sparta was fighting a defensive 
war, punctuated by Athenian raids throughout the coast of the 
Peloponnese, the occupation of Kythera by Nikias and the 
almost total blockade of the Peloponnese ( 4. 53-57; Kagan 
1974: 263-264; Bengtson 1988: 141) . 134 The surrender in August 
424 of Sparta's hoplites at Sphakteria highlighted the crisis 
and led to Sparta's vain overtures for peace (4.11-15; Kagan 
1974:237-238). It appeared to be only a matter of time before 
Sparta would be forced to her knees (Bengtson 1988: 141). 
Sparta hastily accepted the invitation of Perdikkas which 
could make her newly formulated strategy of attacking Athens 
in Thrace a reality (Brunt JCAC 1965:274; Kagan 1974:289). 
coast line and the mining revenues of Mt. Pangaion (Hdt. 
5.17). Athenian support of his brother, Philip, as a rival to 
the throne exacerbated his hostility (1.57.2). Covertly and 
unsuccessfully, he had sought to get Sparta to deploy military 
forces against Athens (Hammond 1986:320). Partly due to his 
instigation both the Chalkidians and the Bottiaians revolted 
from Athens in 432 (4.56.1-2; 4.57.3). Although a nominal ally 
of Athens in 429, he offered no assistance to the Athenians in 
their offensive in the Chalkidike (2.79.1-5). 
1~. Athens now held fortified posts at Pylos, Kythera, 
Methana, Nisaia, Minoa, Pteleon and Atalante, and her fleet 
had bases at Zakynthos, Kephallenia, Korkyra, Naupaktos and 
Akarnania (Hammond 1986:369). 
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Brasidas, the daring and highly imaginative Spartan 
general, took command of the campaign ( 4. 78 .1.) 135 He began 
recruiting forces in the Peloponnese for a counter-offensive 
for Spartan losses in the Peloponnese. 
In August of the same year, Athens initiated a campaign 
to gain control of the Megarid. The scope of this offensive 
cannot be justified as an attempt by Athens to block off 
future invasions of Attica. 136 Minoa, taken by Athens in 
427, became the base for this new Athenian offensive 
( 4. 67. 1) . 137 In a coordinated campaign between the Athenian 
general, Hippokrates, with a garrison from Minoa, and 
Demosthenes who had just returned to Athens from his campaign 
in Aitolia and Naupaktos (4.66.3-4), the Athenians breached 
and occupied the Long Walls joining Megara to Nisaia, Megara's 
135 Commentators have drawn di verse conclusions concerning 
Brasidas' role in the campaign. According to Thukydides 
(4.81.1), the Spartans sent him on this mission, chiefly from 
his own des ire ( 2:> o \.:>A.~ ~ e:v b~ ) , supported by Gemme 
(1956b:548); and Kagan- (1974:289). Contra, c. Hude (ed. 
Teubner) who reads ~o\J_>..6 ~t..\IO\., supported by Adcock (CAH 
5 243); and Hammond (198b:372), according to whom the Spartans 
supported Brasidas' campaign. Hude's conjecture is followed by 
the author. 
136 Sparta had several years earlier abandoned hope that 
the invasions of Attica would bring Athens to her knees (Gemme 
1956b:395). Sparta's most recent invasion on Attica in 425, 
the year before the Megarid offensive, lasted only 15 days, 
the shortest campaign conducted (4.2.1;4.6.2). 
137 Athens had captured Minoa about the same time as 
Plataiai's final surrender to the Spartans (3.52.1). We may 
speculate whether the fall of this last barrier to Sparta's 
expanding presence in Central Greece may have invoked an 
Athenian resolve to stop the enemy at the Megarid. 
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port on the Saronic Gulf ( 4. 68) 138 , and captured Nisaia 
(4.66-77). Sparta was faced with the alarming possibility that 
Megara itself would go over to the Athenians. 139 
The Athenian offensive against Nisaia was undertaken 
while Brasidas was in Sikyon and Corinth, recruiting troops 
for the march to Thrace (4.70.1). Brasidas, fearful lest the 
Athenian armies under Demosthenes and Hippokrates should take 
Megara, marched to its defense (4.70.1). He also summoned the 
Boiotians to join him, and they responded with troops and 
cavalry. 140 Although Nisaia had fallen before Brasidas 
arrived, his presence brought about a stalemate between the 
Athenian and the Spartan forces which ultimately resulted in 
138 By this action the Athenian generals prevented the 
Spartans, entrenched in Nisaia, from giving support to Megara 
(4.66.4). 
139 As early as 427 Megara was undergoing civil strife 
(4.67.1), aggravated by the dreadful economic boycott imposed 
by Athens (Jones 1968:72). The oligarchic faction, previously 
expelled from Megara by the democrats, was entrenched at 
Pegai. The democrats in Megara, fearing their return, enlisted 
the aid of Athens and promised to deliver the city to her 
(4.66.3-4), permitting the opening of her ports for trade, and 
possibly, ending the civil war. Spartan troops, apparently 
unaware of these covert intrigues, were garrisoned at Nisaia 
to counter the Athenian presence at Minoa. 
140 The Boiotians recognized that Megara in the hands of 
Athens would isolate them from the Peloponnese and leave 
Athens free to attack them (4.72.1; Gemme 1956b:532). So 
concerned were they with this danger that they began their 
troop movements to assist Megara even before the summons from 
Brasidas arrived. The Athenians were startled, since they had 
never seen any previous Boiotian support for Megara in their 
earlier incursions in the Megarid (4.72.1). 
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the acceptance by Megara of Brasidas' army and the end of the 
Athenian initiative. 141 
Brasidas returned to Corinth and continued his 
preparations for Thrace (4.74.1). Thukydides does not suggest 
any connection between the Athenian offensive against Nisaia 
and Brasidas' imminent march to Thrace. 142 Modern 
commentators have either ignored this question (Adcock CAH 5; 
Hammond 1986:372) or denied any Athenian awareness (Kagan 
1974: 278, following Gemme 1956b: 535-36). 143 
The implication that the Athenians did not know what was 
going on is unacceptable and must be rejected. Brasidas had 
been recruiting throughout the Peloponnese to hire an army. 
The army that marched to Thrace had 700 freed helots, or 
neodamodeis, but no Spartans; the bulk of the army was from 
141 When neither side attacked, the Athenians withdrew 
and retired into Nisaia, and the Megarians thereupon opened 
their gates to Brasidas (4.73.4). The Athenian strategy for 
the betrayal of the city by the democratic element evaporated. 
Athens lost a great strategic opportunity by the failure of 
the Megarian campaign (Kagan 1974:278). Athens' early 
withdrawal from Megara has been criticized (Gemme 1956b:535-
3 6) • 
142 Thukydides tells us that when the Athenians heard 
about Brasidas' arrival in Thrace, they realized that 
Perdikkas' intrigues had made the march possible, and they 
declared war on him ( 4. 82 .1) . The inference is that the 
Athenians did not know about Brasidas' planned campaign before 
Brasidas arrived in Thrace. 
143 Although Gemme accepts that the Athenians were 
unaware of Sparta's intended campaign, he suggests Thukydides 
recognized a connection in the simultaneity between the 
campaigns in Delion and Thrace (Gemme 1956b:540). 
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the Peloponnese (4.80.5) . 144 When the Athenian offensive in 
the Megarid began, Brasidas was already in Corinth, ca. 38 km 
away. This proximity at such a critical moment cannot be 
ascribed to chance. For the same reasons Thukydides' statement 
that Brasidas just happened to be in the neighborhood of 
Corinth when the Athenian assault began ( 4. 70 .1), and the 
opinions of commentators who accept this view (Grote 6.380; 
Adcock CAH 5:239; Hammond 1986:368), must also be rejected. It 
is more credible that the Athenians were aware of Sparta's 
imminent march to Thrace, and the Spartans were aware of 
Athens' new aims against the Megarid. 
The threat which these preparations portended may have 
triggered the Athenian resolve for action in the Megarid. The 
Athenians would be uncertain which route the Spartans would 
use to get to their base at Herakleia. If the Spartans elected 
to take the overland route through Boiotia and Phokis, the 
Athenian control of the Megarid would block the Spartans at 
Megara and stop Brasidas' march. 
If, on the other hand, the Spartans elected to ferry 
troops to Kirrha and march through the Isthmus Corridor to 
Herakleia, Athenian control of the Megarid would still serve 
a highly strategic purpose. Without the threat of a Spartan 
1« Thukydides informs us that the Lakedaimonians were 
glad for an excuse to send out 700 helots to forestall their 
siding with the Athenians at this sensitive time, when Pylos 
was in the hands of the enemy (4.80.2,5). Hammond suggests the 
entire Lakedaimonian campaign was a diversion for this purpose 
(1986:372). 
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army at her back Athens would be free to regain her influence 
in Phokis (Gemme 1956b:532). which, as previously noted, was 
the linchpin for the control of the Central Sector of the 
Isthmus Corridor. The destabilization of the Central Sector by 
Athens would undermine the viability of Sparta's base at 
Herakleia and Sparta's imminent campaign to Thrace. 
Thukydides does not specify the route Brasidas took from 
the Peloponnese to Herakleia. He probably ferried his army 
across the Corinthian Gulf to Kirrha, the south terminus of 
the Great Isthmus Corridor route145 , and then marched his 
troops through the Corridor to Herakleia. He arrived at 
Herakleia that summer with 1,700 hoplites (4.78.1). He then 
marched without resistance through Thessaly (4.78.2-6; 79.1). 
Al though the Thessalians were allies of Athens, 146 and the 
common people well-disposed to the Athenians (4.78.2), the 
local oligarchs were themselves pro-Spartan. The assistance 
which these oligarchs gave Brasidas and his adroitness in 
145 Thukydides only informs us that before his march 
Brasidas returned to Corinth from Megara to continue 
preparations for Thrace ( 4. 74 .1). The same considerations that 
suggest a sea crossing for Sparta's troops before the 
Archidamian War and in 426 (cf. Chapter IV above) would apply 
to Brasidas in 424. Contra, Bengtson who suggests a route 
through Megara and Boiotia in 424 (Bengtson 1988:141-42). 
1~ The Thessalians had become allies of Athens following 
the Messenian revolt at Ithome, ca. 457 (l.102.4). At the 
beginning of the war the Thessalian cavalry assisted the 
Athenians against the Spartan invasion of Attica (2.22.3). 
The Thessalians continually made war upon Herakleia after its 
foundation (3.93.2), an action implying hostility to Sparta. 
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dealing with them insured his rapid and uneventful passage 
(4.78.2-5; Gomme 1956b: 541). 147 If the oligarchs who 
controlled the splendid Thessalian cavalry had opposed 
Brasidas' army in the flat and level plains of Thessaly, it is 
doubtful whether the army would have been able to cross (Kagan 
1974:288). 
Brasidas' campaign in Thrace proved eminently rewarding 
for Sparta. City after city revolted from the Athenians and 
admitted the Peloponnesians. 148 The fall of Amphipolis in 
particular encouraged rebellion in the rest of Thrace (Kagan 
1974:302) and dealt a severe blow to Athenian prestige 
(Hammond 1986:373; Bengtson 1988:142). Cities that were 
subject to Athens, hearing of the capture of Amphipolis and 
the moderate terms offered by Brasidas, were incited to 
revolution and sent emissaries to Brasidas, urging him to come 
over to them (4.108.3). 
147 In contrast, in 423, the Thessalian oligarchs' changed 
attitude prevented the Spartan, Ischagoras, in his plans to 
join Brasidas with a Spartan force ((4.132). Such a change of 
attitude might have been the result of a possible alliance 
between Perdikkas and the Athenians in 423, an alliance based 
on an extremely fragmentary inscription dated to 423 by Gemme 
1956b:621/2, 720, followed by Bengtson 1962: #186, and Kagan 
1974:314. In 421 a Lakedaimonian army of 900 intended to 
furnish support to Brasidas but was delayed by Thessalian 
opposition and was recalled after Brasidas' death (5.13; Kagan 
1974:331). 
148 Revolt at Akanthos in August, 424 (4. 88 .1) was 
followed by revolt at Stagira (4.88.2). The fall of Amphipolis 
in December, 424 (4.106.1) precipitated an immediate and 
domino-like defection by Athen's northern allies, beginning 
with Mirkinos, Galepsos and Oisyme, east of the Strymon river 
(4.107.3). The numerous cities of the Akte peninsula were next 
to revolt or capitulate (4.109; Kagan 1974:302). 
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As mentioned above, Sparta's strategy for a campaign in 
Thrace had depended on three specific conditions: domination 
of Central Greece, control of the Corridor, and securing a 
base at Herakleia. The validity of Sparta's purpose in the 
foundation of Herakleia as part of a land route to Thrace was 
proven by the success of the Thracian campaign in bringing 
about a truce. Conversely, since there is no evidence that 
Herakleia was ever used by the Spartans as a naval base, 
Thukydides' suggestion that Herakleia was intended for that 
purpose (3.92.4) must be rejected. 
Athenian Response 
In the same sum.mer, immediately after the Athenians 
retired from Megara, but after Brasidas had reached Thrace, 
Athens undertook two coordinated campaigns in Boiotia (4.76.1-
3). That these campaigns in Boiotia were part of the same plan 
with the campaign in the Megarid has generally been recognized 
(Gorn.me 1956b:719-720; Adcock CAH 5:239; Kagan 1974:278). The 
connection, however, between these Boiotian campaigns and 
Brasidas' march to Thrace, as with the Megarian campaign, has 
been overlooked. 
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In the first Boiotian campaign Siphai, 149 by the 
prearrangement of certain conspirators within the city, was to 
be betrayed to Demosthenes. Chaironeia, 150 through the 
intrigues of disgruntled refugees from Orchomenos, was also to 
yield to him ( 4. 76. 3) . 151 Demosthenes recruited troops at 
Naupaktos and sailed with 40 ships to Siphai (4.76.1) where he 
was scheduled to arrive at a predetermined date 152 I 
1
" Siphai is situated on the shores of the Corinthian 
Gulf in the territory of Thespiai and is a port of entry into 
Boiotia (4.76.3). It is situated 7 km to the southeast of 
Thisbe (Frazer Paus. 9.32.4) and 8 kms. southwest of Thespiai. 
Its importance as a harbor town is established not only by 
tradition, but also by archaeological evidence. The site was 
also known as Tipha, taking its name from the pilot of the 
Argo who came from Siphai (Keiji Kodai 1991:55). It would have 
been easier for Athens to attack Boiotia through Plataiai, but 
this city had surrendered to Sparta three years earlier 
(3.52.1; Gonune 1956b:541). 
15° Chaironeia' s location is 7 km south of Parapotamioi, 
situated at the pass (ca. 5 km wide) between Phokis and the 
first plain of Boiotia, the Kaironeian Basin, and through 
which the Kephissos river enters Boiotia from Phokis (Strabo 
9.3.16; Fossey 1986:70-71). 
151 As in Megara, a month or so earlier, the occasion for 
Athenian intervention was the disaffection of local citizens 
who wished to transform their city into a democracy (4.76.2). 
152 Demosthenes retired from the Megara campaign ca. 
August, but his offensive against Siphai was not planned to 
take place until the beginning of November, some three months 
later (4.89.l; Gonune 1956b:558). Since the success of the 
Boiotian campaign required surprise, the delay may have been 
intended to sail undetected to Siphai. Although Sparta had in 
425 turned over her fleet to Athens as collateral in the peace 
negotiations following Sphakteria ((4.16.1-3; 4.23.1), Sparta 
had access to at least seven other navies (Kelly 31). 
Lakedaimonian ships, particularly Corinthian and Sikyonian, 
invested, or probably controlled, the eastern Corinthian Gulf 
in 424. A November sailing might be undetected, since rarely 
would ships sail in winter months (Casson 1973:270 n. 3). From 
the third day before the ides of November to the sixth day 
before the ides of March, the seas were closed (Vegetius 
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coordinated with the second Athenian campaign in eastern 
Boiotia. Demosthenes' plan was to make a short march from 
siphai through Lebadeia to Chaironeia, bypassing any hostile 
forces from Thebes. Phokians collaborated with Demosthenes in 
this plot (4.76.3). Thus, we may assume the plan included 
Athenian penetration into western Phokis, as well as delivery 
in Athenian hands of Phokian Phanoteus and Parapotamioi. 153 
While these events were occurring in western Boiotia, 
Athenian hoplites under Hippokrates would march from Athens to 
Tanagra in Boiotia and occupy the sanctuary of Apollo at 
Delion (4.76.4) The Athenian plot, however, was ill-timed and 
betrayed to the Boiotians. The Athenians never set foot at 
Siphai, and at Delion they suffered a major military defeat 
(4.89.1; 4.96; Bengtson 1986:142). 
The enormity of the military defeat suffered by Athens in 
the only pitched battle in the Archidamian War (Hammond 
1986: 371) has magnified the strategic importance of the 
campaign. Thukydides mistakenly treats the eastern campaign of 
Hippokrates at Delion as the primary action and the Siphai-
Chaironeia campaign as only a diversion to insure the success 
1885:4.39). 
1 ~ Panopeus, also known as Phanoteus, situated at the 
Kephissos river about 20 stadia (ca. 3.6 km) west of 
Chaironeia (Paus. 10.4.1), was a point of convergence between 
the road leading from Boiotia up the Kephissos river valley to 
Phokis and the road to Delphi around the southern slopes of 
Mt. Parnassos (Strabo 9.3.14 9.2.19; Paus. 10.4.1-2). 
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of the Delion assault. 154 In neither the campaigns of 426 
nor in the campaigns of 424 was the Athenian purpose the 
conquest of Boiotia (Gomme 1956b:539). In reality, 
oemosthenes and Hippokrates in the 424 campaign repeated 
precisely the same strategy they had used unsuccessfully in 
the 426 campaign. 
In both years the Athenians intended by the campaigns in 
the west to destabilize Sparta's control of the Corridor and 
regain a dominant presence in Phokis. In both years the 
campaigns in the east were diversionary maneuvers. In 426 the 
Athenians hoped to destabilize the Corridor by an attack on 
Kytinion via Aitolia and West Lokris. In 424, the Athenians 
hoped to accomplish the same goal through Chaironeia and the 
Kephissos valley. 
If the Athenian offensive in 424 had been successful, it 
is probable that Phokis and the Central Sector of the Isthmus 
Corridor route would have come under Athenian influence. 
Although Brasidas' army had already reached Thrace, perhaps 
three months earlier, Athens' control of the Corridor would 
154 According to Thukydides the purpose of this two-
pronged attack was that in this way the Boiotians "might not 
concentrate their forces at Delium" (4.76.4 (C.F.Smith tr). 
Gemme finds the use of the temple site by the Athenians as a 
base for continuing raids on, or encouraging revolution in, 
neighboring Boiotian villages an acceptable purpose, 
consistent with the similar use of bases at Kythera and Pylos 
(Gornme 1956b:538). 
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have thwarted Brasidas' spectacular reversal of earlier 
Spartan misfortunes. 155 
Results 
As a result of the Thracian campaign Athens lost 
revenues, and the gold mines of Mt. Pangaion fell into 
Sparta's hands. With the timber from the area Brasidas could 
start building a fleet (4.108.1; Hammond: 1986:373). The 
bridgehead at the Strymon river was opened to the Spartans, 
and Brasidas urgently begged the Lakedaimonians for 
reinforcements, a plea which the Spartans chose not to heed 
(4.108.7; Kagan 1974:303). It appears probable that he 
intended a major campaign, aiming at a decisive victory (Kagan 
1976:302). He may have intended an eastward thrust to gain 
control of the Hellespont and interdict the Athenian grain 
supplies from the Black Sea (Kagan 1974:302-303). 
The possibility of such an assault, and of further revolt 
among their allies, greatly alarmed the Athenians (4.108.1; 
4.108.7). This alarm most likely contributed to the Athenian 
receptiveness to Sparta's overtures for peace (Adcock CAH 
5:244; Kagan 1974:303-304). For Sparta the campaign in Thrace 
was a tactical lever to get the Athenians to the negotiating 
155 Brasidas march to Thrace from Herakleia was probably 
mid-August (4.78.1; Gemme 1956b:720; Kagan 1974:287). 
Demosthenes reached Siphai early in November (4.77.1; Kagan 
1974:281). 
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table. 156 Sparta was not interested in total victory, but 
rather, wished to recover the prisoners from Sphakteria and 
bring the war to an end (4.108.7). 
Sparta's campaign in Thrace was made possible because 
Sparta controlled a communication route through Central Greece 
and a fortified eagle's nest on the Trachinian cliffs. In 
spring 423 the success of this campaign precipitated the 
armistice which Sparta wanted (4.117.1) and, eventually, a 
peace treaty. 157 
156 • Ever since the capture of the Spartans on Sphakteria 
the peace faction in Sparta had been dominant and had sent 
missions to the Athenians to explore peace, but were rejected 
(Kagan 1974:303). 
157 That the truce was broken, and fighting resumed, 
before a peace was finally concluded may be attributed to the 
personalities of Kleon and Brasidas, to whom Thukydides 
referred as the men on each side most opposed to peace 
(5.16.1; Gomme 1956b:660; Kagan 1974:331), and not to any 
defect in the Spartan plan. Included in the terms of the Peace 
of Nikias was the return of the prisoners from Sphakteria 
(5.18.7). It is worthy of note that the first stipulation of 
the treaty grants free access to Delphi for all worshippers 
(5.18.1), suggesting Sparta still controlled the Corridor. 
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CONCLUSION 
Sparta selected Herakleia as the site for a colony in 
Trachis land to control the Isthmus Corridor road system and 
establish a base for the invasion of Thrace. 
Unaware of this road system, most commentators believe 
that Herakleia's role was closely connected with Thermopylai. 
But the city neither neutralized nor controlled the pass. In 
the fifth century this pass was virtually closed by the 
encroachment of the Malian Gulf, and was not suitable for the 
mass movements of men or goods. It was an available, but less 
desirable, route for entry into Central Greece. 
The strategic importance of Herakleia was its connection 
with the Great Isthmus Corridor road system, and specifically, 
its proximity to, and tactical connection with, the north 
entrance to that road system, the Dhema pass. 
Sparta's resolve to maintain control of the Corridor road 
system, counterbalanced by Athens' efforts to thwart that 
control, defined military actions in the Archidamian War, the 
purpose of which previously has been unclear. Among such 
military actions were: Sparta's two year siege, beginning in 
429, to capture Plataiai; Athens' invasion of the Megarid in 
the same year, ostensibly 
the largest military 
to conduct a raid, but utilizing 
force Athens ever assembled; 
Demosthenes' campaign in 426, reportedly extemporaneous, but 
aimed at Kytinion, which happened to be a linchpin of the 
Central Sector of the Corridor road system; Athens' two-
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pronged campaign in 424, again led by Demosthenes, aimed at 
western Boiotia and Phokis, the underbelly of the Central 
Sector of the Corridor road system; Eurylochos' siege to 
capture Naupaktos, which did not infringe Sparta's interests 
by its domination of the western Corinthian Gulf, but did 
threaten the South Sector of the Corridor road system. 
In 424 Brasidas executed the new strategy by launching 
the much planned invasion of Thrace. As shown above, this 
invasion induced Athens' allies to revolt from Athenian 
domination, brought about a truce and an end to the war, 
vindicating the purpose for which Herakleia was founded. 
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